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Buffer overflow happens when the runtime process loads more data into the buffer 
than its design capacity. Bad programming style and lack of security concern cause overflow 
vulnerabilities in almost all applications on all the platforms. As a common vulnerability, 
buffer overflow accounts for more than 20% of the public vulnerabilities reported in 
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (version 20040901). 
Buffer overflow attack can target any data in stack or heap. A common target of 
overflow attack is return address stored in the stack during runtime. By overflowing the 
return address, the attacker could redirect the program control flow when the current function 
returns. Many solutions have been proposed to protect return address from being overflowed, 
like StackGaurd, StackShield et cetera. However the current solutions ignore the overflowed 
targets other than return address. 
Function pointer, for example, is another possible target of overflow attack. By 
overflowing the function pointer in stack or heap, the attacker could redirect the program 
control flow when the function pointer is dereferenced to make a function call. To address 
this problem we implemented protection against overflow attacks targeting function pointers. 
During compiling phase, our patch collects the set of the variables that might change the 
value of function pointers at runtime. During running phase, the set is protected by 
encryption before the value is saved in memory and decryption before the value is used. The 
function pointer protection will cover all the overflow attacks targeting function pointers. 
To further extend the protection to cover all possible overflowing targets, we 
implemented an anomaly detection which checks the program runtime behavior against 
control flow checking automata. The control flow checking automata are derived from the 
source codes of the application. A trust value is introduced to indicate how well the runtime 
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program matches the automata. The attacks modifying the program behavior within the 
source codes could be detected. 
Both function pointer protection and control flow checking are compiler patches 
which require the access to source codes. To cover buffer overflow attack and enforce 
security policies regardless of source codes, we implemented a runtime monitor with stream 
automata. Stream automata extend the concept of security automata and edit automata. The 
monitor works on the interactions between two virtual entities: system and program. The 
security policies are expressed in stream automata which perform Truncation, Suppression, 
Insertion, Metamorphosis, Forcing, and Two-Way Forcing on the interactions. We 
implement a program/operating system monitor to detect overflow attack and a local 
network/Internet monitor to enforce honeywall policies. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Network security has been an active research area for almost two decades. Buffer 
overflow, as an attack technique, has been studied and researched since the beginning of 
Internet threats. In this chapter, we give a brief introduction to Internet threats and buffer 
overflow attacks. Then we talk about the existing approaches against overflow attacks and 
their shortcomings. Based on existing work, we present our contribution and organization of 
the thesis. 
1.1 Internet threats 
1.1.1 Threats 
Internet was technically born on January 1st, 1983 when ARPANET officially 
changed to use TCP/IP protocol [Wiki, 2006]. At its birth, Internet included only a few 
hundred machines and served a few hundred users from the government, institutes and 
universities [Whitehouse, 1996]. 
As a popular media for the modern world, Internet has been growing at a very 
dramatic speed. Within the last twenty-two years, Internet users have grown from less than 
1,000 to over 1,000,000,000 as of January, 2006 [Stats, 2006]. People depend heavily on 
Internet for working, shopping, entertaining, socializing, living, and studying. 
However, Internet has never been a secure and safe place to surf. Worm, virus, spam, 
phishing, adware etc. threaten Internet users everyday. The number of Internet incidents 
reported to CERT has almost doubled every year from 1988 to 2003 [CERT, 2005]. 
Internet attacks affect thousands to millions of machines and cause millions to 
billions of dollars worth of damage. Take two of the most famous worms as examples: 
1. Morris Worm - one of the earliest Internet worms - was launched by Robert T. 
Morris on November 2, 1988 from MIT. The worm infected 6,000 major UNIX 
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machines, which accounted for 10% of the Internet machines at that time and 
caused the damage estimated at 1,000,000 dollars. [Wiki, 2006] 
2. Code-Red Worm II - one of the most recent worms - was launched on August 4th, 
2001. Code-Red Worm II infected over 359,000 machines on Internet within 14 
hours [Moore et al., 2001] and Code-Red Worm caused total damages estimated 
at 2,600,000,000 dollars [Lemos, 2003]. 
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Figure 1.1 Incidents Reported to CERT 
Today the software installed on computers usually consists of millions of lines of 
source codes. The vulnerabilities are inevitable on all the platforms. Among them, buffer 
overflow is the most popular one which the Internet attacks take advantage of. 
1.1.2 Buffer overflow attacks 
Buffer overflow attack happens when the runtime program tries to load into the buffer 
more data than its design capability. Bad programming style and lack of security concern 
cause overflow vulnerabilities in almost all applications on all the platforms. If a hacker 
successfully exploited buffer overflow vulnerability, the hacker might be able to modify 
system configuration, set up backdoor and run random program with administrator privilege. 
Many attacks utilize buffer overflow vulnerabilities. According to CVE version 
20040901 (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures), there were 3,053 total vulnerabilities 
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from 1999 to 2004. Among them, 644 were overflow attacks, which accounts for 21% of all 
attacks. 
The Morris Worm and Code-Red Worm mentioned above both utilize buffer 
overflow vulnerabilities to spread. We use Morris Worm to demonstrate how a buffer might 





Input 536 bytes 
Buf [512 
0x0000 
Figure 1.2 Morris Worm Overflow Exploit 
One target of Morris Warm - BSD Fingerd v4.3 - gets input using a standard c 
library getsQ function call. getsQ will put the input into the buffer (size of 512 bytes) in the 
fingerd runtime stack without checking the boundary. Morris Worm exploits this 
vulnerability by sending a carefully designed input string of 536 bytes to it. The input string 
will fill the buffer first and then overflow the memories adjacent to the buffer in the stack. As 
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the return address is stored adjacent to memory of local variables in the stack, the input string 
has a chance to overflow the return address. Thus, when the current function returns, the 
overflowed return address is loaded and the program jumps to the middle of the stack, where 
the crafted instructions in the input string get executed. As most of fingerd daemons run with 
root privilege, Morris Worm could execute random instructions on the victim machine. 
[Spafford, 1988] 
1.2 Current research against overflow attacks 
Significant research has been done against overflow attacks. We categorize them by 
the program phase where the proposed solutions are applicable. Usually there are two phases 
for all the programs: compiling and running. For the compiling phase, the compiler turns the 
program in high level language into binary codes. For the running phase, the operating 
system loads the program and allocates memory of text, data and stack for the process and 
then executes it. 
Compiling phase solutions include safe language, static analyzer and compiler 
modification [Younan et al., 2004]. The approaches in this category require access to the 
source codes and do not work for legacy binary codes. 
1. Safe language is designed to eliminate the possibility of overflow attack from the 
very beginning. Program annotations and special structures help compilers to 
detect possible overflow danger at the early phase. The approach requires the 
program be implemented in safe language. 
2. Static analyzer scans the existing program source code to locate the possible 
overflow conditions. Due to the incomplete information from static analysis, static 
analyzer might generate both false positives and false negatives. 
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3. Compiler modification generates extra checking codes for the program during 
compiling. At runtime the codes could check overflow conditions, protect 
important variables or enforce certain security policies etc. 
Running phase solutions include sandboxing, anomaly detection and environment 
modification [Younan et al., 2004]. The running phase solutions have the advantage that they 
do not need the access to the source codes. 
1. Sandboxing enforces the "Principle of Least Privilege". The runtime process will 
not be protected from overflow attacks. The sandbox grants only necessary 
privilege to process and limits the possible harm ability of exploited process. 
2. Anomaly detection derives the normal behaviors of process from runtime 
collecting or static analysis. The runtime process is monitored against the normal 
behaviors. If certain deviation between the runtime process and normal behavior 
is detected, a corresponding action will be taken, like terminating the process, 
sending an alert to the administrator, or logging process behaviors etc. 
3. Environment modification includes the modifications to the operating system, 
library, and hardware. These modifications might disable codes running other 
than DATA section, randomize memory layouts or change the implementation of 
library etc. 
For easier comparison with our approaches, we will discuss the detail of related 
works in Chapter 2, 3 and 4. 
Majority of the current solutions have ignored the advanced overflow techniques that 
target objects other than the return address. Overflow attacks could target any data in the 
stack or heap. The overflowed data will change the runtime behavior of the program. A 
carefully crafted change can finally lead to attacker's code. 
Take function pointer as one example: an attacker overflows a function pointer with 
the starting address of attacking codes. When the function pointer is dereferenced during 
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runtime, the attacking codes get executed. Biondi et al. describes an overflow attack targeting 
at function pointer in Skype [Biondi et al., 2006]. 
1.3 Our contribution and thesis organization 
How to protect against the advanced overflow attacks is the main problem that this 
thesis tries to solve. We take three different approaches to address this problem. 
Chapter 2 introduces an encryption based protection for potential function pointers 
through a compiler patch. This protection gathers the information on potential function 
pointers set at compiling phase and inserts patch codes to encrypt/decrypt function pointers. 
At runtime, the patch codes will encrypt the function pointer before putting it into memory 
and decrypt it before loading it from memory. The technique protects the advanced overflow 
attacks targeting function pointers. The general idea applies to other targets of the process 
also. The system overhead brought by the function pointer protection is lower than 5% for 
simple encryption algorithm. 
Chapter 3 introduces a control flow integrity enforcement technique through compiler 
patch. This technique tries to solve the overflow problem from an anomaly detection point of 
view. The basic idea is to enforce program runtime behavior according to the source code 
design. While all the overflow attacks succeed in changing program runtime behavior, we 
address a subset of those attacks which change the program runtime behavior within program 
codes. The control flow enforcement technique derives control flow graph from the 
compiling phase to enforce the program runtime behavior according to control flow graph. 
The monitor generates a program level trust for the program execution according to how well 
the program behavior matches the control flow checking automata. In such a way, if the 
attacker exploits and changes the behavior of the process, the mismatch between the program 
behavior and trust automata will lower the trust level to alert the administrator. 
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Both function pointer protection and control flow enforcement are compiling phase 
techniques, which require access to source codes and are not capable of protecting legacy 
codes. We present the protection of legacy codes in Chapter 4 with a powerful runtime 
monitor which enforces stream automata. This work enforces security policies on the 
interactions between two entities that communicate with each other. As these two entities are 
abstract objects, stream automata could be applied to all the cases where interacting objects 
are involved. Considering the two entities as program and operating system, we implement 
the stream automata monitor to enforce program level security policy and detect overflow 
attacks. Considering the two entities as server and network, we implement Stream Automata 
Firewall Engine to enforce the security policy of the network flows. 
Chapter 5 will summarize and outline the future work. 
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CHAPTER 2. FUNCTION POINTER PROTECTION 
In this chapter, we target indirect buffer overflow attacks that overflow a buffer in 
memory to re-point a function pointer to the attacker's program. This type of attack could 
bypass most of the current stack protection mechanisms. Our proposed approach encrypts a 
function pointer before it is put into the memory and decrypts it before it is taken from the 
memory. Each function pointer is encrypted with a unique key that is randomized for each 
program run. This leads to two desirable properties: (1) orthogonality of key space, (2) zero 
incremental knowledge gain for the adversary between two attacks on two different program 
runs. The key space orthogonality does not allow a one key compromise to propagate to other 
function pointers. The "zero knowledge gain" forces the adversary to compromise all (or 
most of) the keys in the same run. This is difficult since runtime key randomization leads to a 
232 iteration brute force attack on each key for a 32-bit architecture. This scheme was 
incorporated into GCC-3.0 on RedHat 7.0 Linux distribution. The performance overhead of 
this scheme is below 4.5% on Apache web server version 1.3.22 with WebStone 2.5 as 
benchmark. 
2.1 Introduction 
Buffers or arrays are designed to hold up to a certain amount of data. A buffer 
overflows if a write access to an array element beyond its declared boundaries is attempted. 
Such an access overwrites some other program variable that is allocated in the vicinity of the 
overflowing buffer. Although, the data segments vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks are 
created accidentally through programming error or oversight, the buffer overflow exploits are 
very deliberately researched, thereby making it an increasingly common type of security 
attack on data integrity. In buffer overflow attacks, the extra data may contain code designed 
to trigger specific actions, in effect sending new instructions to the attacked computer that 
could, for example, damage the user's files, change data, or disclose confidential information. 
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Buffer overflow attacks are said to have arisen because the C programming language 
supplied the framework, and poor programming practices supplied the vulnerability. 
We distinguish between two categories of buffer overflow attacks: direct and indirect 
buffer overflow attacks. Direct buffer overflow attacks use direct mechanisms to modify a 
program counter bound address. The indirect buffer overflow attacks, on the other hand, use 
indirect means of getting to the program counter such as tampering of a function pointer. We 
define and describe direct and indirect buffer overflow attacks in Section 2.2. 
Many research projects have proposed techniques to prevent buffer overflow attacks, 
such as run-time bounds checking, stack protection etc. Most solutions are either not able to 
protect against indirect buffer overflow or experience excessive system overload for such 
protection. PointGuard [Cowan el al., 2003] does deal with pointer protection. However it 
makes weak assumptions about its attack space. We discuss some of the existing solutions in 
more detail in Section 2.3. 
In this chapter we offer an efficient and effective technique to defend against buffer 
overflow attacks directed at function pointers in stack, global, or heap data spaces. The key 
idea is to encrypt a function pointer whenever it is stored in the memory. It is decrypted after 
it is retrieved from memory before any use. Moreover, each function pointer has a distinct 
encryption/decryption key that is altered for each run. The attacker can overflow into a 
function pointer only an un-encrypted address. The automatic decryption of an un-encrypted 
function pointer before its use will generate an invalid address. We discuss the proposed 
scheme in more detail in Section 2.4. 
The encryption algorithm of the protection is vital for security and efficiency. We 
implement both simple and complex encryption schemes which are discussed in Section 2.5 
and 2.6. 
We conclude in Section 2.7. 
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2.2 Direct buffer overflow vs. indirect buffer overflow 
Buffer overflow occurs due to lack of bounds checking in C. We distinguish between 
the following two categories of buffer overflow attacks: direct and indirect. The main 
objective of a buffer overflow attack is to tamper with a program visible value that will 
eventually be moved to the program counter (PC). We refer to such values as PC-bound 
values. This is how the control is redirected to the attack program. When such a PC-bound 
value is moved to PC directly after tampering, we call it a direct attack. Such is the case for 
return address on the stack. The function return action directly moves the tampered return 
address into PC. Some of the PC-bound values, however, are moved to PC in a more 
indeterminate way. For instance, a tampered function pointer is moved to PC only when a 
function call is made with dereferencing of the function pointer. This is what we consider to 
be an indirect means of moving a PC-bound value to PC. Direct buffer overflow attacks 
typically target only the stack area of the memory. Indirect buffer overflow attacks can target 
all the three areas of memory: stack, heap and global static data. 
We show two examples to demonstrate the basic difference between direct and 
indirect buffer overflow attacks. The shellcode in the two examples comes from [One, 1996]. 
It generates a system call to spawn a shell. All the examples are tested on RedHat 7.0 with 
GCC-3.0. 
2.2.1 Direct buffer overflow example 
As shown in Figure 2.1, the array buf is declared to be of length 1. Line 12 of direct.c 
puts the address of shellcode into buf[2], which overflows into the return address on the stack. 
When main returns, the program calls the shellcode which generates a shell for the attacker. 
11 
direct.c OxFFFFFFFF 
01 //Direct buffer overflow Stack growth 
02 Stack 
03 char shellcodeO = i buf[2] ,return address 
1 04 "\xeb\x1 f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0" / i buf[1] 
~T — 
'old frame pointer 1 Stack frame 
05 "\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b" / i buf[0] ; buf[0] of main r  
06 "\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c" y 
i 
07 "\xcd\x80\x31Xxdb\x89\xd8Xx40\xcd" / i i 
08 "\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh"; / i i 
i 




11 intbuf[1]; / 
12 buf[2] = (int)shellcode; 
Text 
1 3 }  
Result 
[Local]$ gcc -ggdb -o direct direct.c 
[Local]$ ./direct 0x00000000 
sh-2.05b$ 
Figure 2.1 Direct Buffer Overflow 
2.2.2 Indirect buffer overflow example 
As shown in Figure 2.2, the array buf is declared to be of length 1. Line 16 of 
indirect.c puts the address of shellcode into buf[l], which overflows into a function pointer 
fp, which is a neighbor of buf and which originally points to function foo. When fp is used to 
make a function call, the program calls the shellcode instead of the original function foo. 
In this example the indirect buffer overflow attack occurs in stack. However, it could 
equally well target stack, heap and global static data space resident function pointers. 
Although the two examples here are not real-life attacks, they demonstrate the 
possibility that indirect buffer overflow vulnerabilities are real and feasible. The majority of 
the current solutions for buffer overflow attacks focus on direct buffer overflow attacks, 
which are discussed in Section 2.3. We base our work on the security of function pointers 
12 
and defend against indirect buffer overflow, as explained and demonstrated in Section 2.4 
and 2.5. 
indirecte OxFFFFFFFF 
01 // Indirect buffer overflow Stack growth 
02 Stack 
03 int foo(){ printf("ln foo. ");} return address 
04 char shellcodeO = old frame pointer Stack frame 
05 "\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0" J buf[1] ^ of main r 
06 "\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b" >A ; buf[0] ; bufto] 
07 "\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c" / i 
08 "\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd" / i 
09 "\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh"; / i i i 
10 / \ 
Data 
11intmain(){ / J£ shellcode 
12 intCfP)(); / 
13 intbuf[1]; / 
14 / Text 
15 fp = foo; / 
16 buf[1] = (int)shellcode; 
17 fp(); 
18 printfÇ'The last instruction. "); 
0x00000000 
1 9 }  
Result 
[Local]$ gcc -ggdb -o indirect indirect.c 
[Local]$ ./indirect 
sh-2.05b$ 
Figure 2.2 Indirect Buffer Overflow 
2.3 Related work on overflow attacks 
Significant research has been done against overflow attacks. A complete survey like 
[Younan et al., 2004] is not presented here due to the limit of space. In this section we list 
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several popular countermeasures and discuss their shortcomings in the indirect overflow 
pointer of view. 
2.3.1 StackShield 
StackShield [Vendicator, 2000] is a GCC extension to protect a return address from 
buffer overflow in stack. It also protects function pointers against overflow. The basic 
technique is to maintain a fixed depth return address stack similar to the return address stack 
of a superscalar microarchitecture for jump address prediction. The program stack return 
address could be validated against the return address given by the return address stack. The 
weaknesses of this approach are as follows. First, the return address stack itself could be 
target of an attack. Second, since the return address stack is a finite size (k) array, the attack 
can choose to overflow a return address that is at least k stack frames away. The return 
address stack does not maintain the call history that far away, and hence the attack will 
succeed. Third, the protection for function pointers is not fully functional and stops 
protecting programs with executable asm code in DATA or STACK segment. 
2.3.2 StackGuard 
StackGuard [Cowan et al., 1998] is another GCC extension to protect against stack 
smashing attacks. StackGuard is implemented as a small patch to the GCC code generator, 
specifically the function _prolog() and function _epilog() routines. The procedure 
function_prolog() has been enhanced to lay down canaries on the stack when functions start, 
and function_epilog() checks canary integrity when the function exits. Any attempt at 
corrupting the return address is thus detected before the function returns. 
StackGuard only deals with the stack safety with respect to only a smashing attack, 
which is not enough to protect a function pointer in other parts of memory. The alteration of 
stack layout by embedding the canary sometimes has other undesirable effects that have led 
to low acceptability for StackGuard. 
14 
2.3.3 Efficient Detection 
Efficient detection by [Austin et al., 1994] uses an extended representation, safe 
pointers, to detect all spatial and temporal access errors. Three steps are needed to implement 
the protection. First, all the pointers in the program are transformed to safe pointer objects. 
Second, access check code segments are inserted before pointer or array dereferences to 
detect memory access errors. Third, operator conversion generates and maintains necessary 
object attributes for safe pointers. This approach leads to execution time overheads, which 
range from 130% to 540%, and data space overheads, which are below 100%. This approach 
also changes the representation of a pointer, which makes it incompatible with codes without 
bounds checking enabled. 
2.3.4 Automated Detection 
The automated detection by [Wagner et al., 2000] formulates detection of buffer 
overruns as an integer range analysis problem. The basic idea is to model buffers as pairs of 
integer ranges that identify the size in use and the allocated size. An integer range constraint 
is generated for each statement in the program. Then each string buffer is checked with the 
constraints to see whether the size in use is not bigger that the allocated size. Due to 
imprecision in the range analysis, the approach generates a large number of false alarms. 
2.3.5 Annotation-assisted Static Checking 
Annotation-assisted static checking by [Larochelle et al., 2001] extends the semantics 
comments of LCLint to represent assumptions and constraints of buffers. When a function 
call is issued, LCLint checks if the preconditions required of the called function are satisfied 
before the call. The technique uses annotations provided by programmers to detect possible 
buffer overflows. As many buffer overflows use unsafe library functions, those overflow 
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vulnerabilities could be detected by annotating the standard library as well. This approach 
produces false warnings and it also misses some vulnerabilities. 
2.3.6 Cleanness Checking of String Manipulations 
Cleanness checking by Dor et al. [Dor et al., 2001] is another static analysis to detect 
all the possible overflow errors at compiling time. The result is promising as it will not report 
many false positives. However, this approach requires not only access to the source codes but 
also the annotation of preconditions, post conditions and side effects of functions from the 
programmer. 
2.3.7 Backwards-compatible Bounds Checking 
"Backwards-compatible bounds checking" by [Jones et al., 1997] avoids 
incompatibility of "efficient detection" with legacy codes. This approach does not change the 
pointer representation. It maintains a table of all valid pointers with static bounds information 
about the data objects bound to the pointer. The function calls to allocate and free memory 
(like malloc()/free(')) are modified to add/delete dynamically allocated objects. For stack 
objects, constructor/destructor mechanism is utilized to track those variables (as GCC is built 
to handle C++ as well). The pointer and array operations are modified to add bounds 
checking using the table. The performance overhead of this approach is up to 100 times the 
original execution time [Jones et al., 1997]. 
2.3.8 Type-assisted Dynamic Buffer Overflow Detection 
Type-assisted dynamic buffer overflow detection by [Lhee et al., 2002] is a dynamic 
bounds checking technique. It uses a structure to remember buffer information. For automatic 
buffers and static buffers, this technique collects necessary buffer information during 
compilation. For dynamically allocated (heap) objects, it maintains a table to track those 
objects and their sizes at runtime. Range checking is done by looking up the table at run time. 
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This approach has inherent limitations such as its incapability to deal with stack buffers 
dynamically allocated with allocaQ and variable-length automatic arrays. The execution time 
overhead of this approach for single function call is up to 6 times the original execution time. 
2.3.9 Libsafe and Libverify 
Libsafe and Libverify [Baratloo et al., 2000] protect return address at runtime. 
Libsafe calculates a safe upper limit on the size of the buffer automatically according the 
previous frame pointer. All the unsafe library calls (like strcpyQ) will be monitored such that 
the result won't overflow the address on top of the previous frame pointer. Libverify saves 
canary values (return addresses) into canary stack at the beginning of a function call and 
checks the canary when a function call returns. Libverify is different from StackGuard in that 
Libverify inserts checking codes at the runtime such that it applies to all legacy codes. 
Libsafe and Libverify do not protect against indirect overflow attacks. 
2.3.10 IBM GCC extension 
IBM GCC extension [IBM, 2005] protects applications from stack-smashing attack. 
This approach uses guard/canary similar to the StackGuard. The guard is put between the old 
frame pointer and the local variable to form a safe frame structure. 
The guard will be set when the program enters a function call and will be checked 
before the program leaves a function call. If the guard is compromised when the program 
leaves a function call, the program stops and the behavior is logged. 
The approach works partially for indirect overflow attacks in the way that it declares 
all the local variables in the stack are safe. From source codes transformation, it brings the 
declarations of all the local arrays to the top of the function. In such a way, if a smashing 
stack happens in one of the arrays, it can only overflow the memories on top of it in the stack. 
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Figure 2.3 Safe Frame Structure 
However, this approach has the following limitations: 
1. The function pointers in DATA section are not protected, for example, global 
function pointers, static function pointers, etc. 
2. The function pointers within a data structure are not protected. 
3. The function pointers in arguments are not protected. 
4. The function pointers before dynamic allocated arrays are not protected. 
5. The functions with trampoline codes are not protected. 
2.3.11 PointGuard 
PointGuard [Cowan et al., 2003] is a very recent research which has been developed 
simultaneously with our work (Our work first appeared in a final project report to DARPA 
[Tyagi, 2003]). 
PointGuard protects pointers from buffer overflow attacks. The basic scheme of 
PointGuard is to encrypt pointer values in memory and decrypt the pointers when loaded into 
CPU registers. 
The main difference between PointGuard and our work are: 
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1. PointGuard uses one key per program. We use one key per function pointer. This 
increases the search space overwhelmingly for the adversary. 
2. PointGuard assumes that the encrypted function pointer values are not read-
compromised by the attacker. Otherwise, the attacker could take advantage of this 
assumption to bypass PointGuard. For example, if the attacker could read the 
encrypted value of a single pointer, the key of the program can be derived trivially 
since the function pointer value can be duplicated on a similar computing node 
controlled by the attacker. PointGuard is then compromised for all the pointers. 
We generate a unique key for each function pointer for each run of the program. 
Hence, even if the attacker is able to read the encrypted value for one function 
pointer, that is the only compromised function pointer; and the advantage lasts 
only for that run. 
3. PointGuard utilizes a simple XOR encryption/decryption which is so weak that 
they have to make strong assumptions about the attacker. We implement RC5 
encryption/decryption for function pointer such that the attacker can not derive 
the key even if it has the access to part of the clear text and encrypted text. 
4. C allows integers to be cast into function pointers and vice versa. PointGuard 
makes it possible to violate the program semantics when such casting occurs. For 
instance, consider an integer variable assigned a function pointer through casting. 
PointGuard decrypts a function pointer only on dereferencing. Hence, the integer 
variable will have a different value than intended, i.e. an encrypted version that 
can alter the program behavior. 
5. The casting in C also causes PointGuard to protect an incomplete set of variables 
that affect function pointers at runtime. For example, the attacker might overflow 
an integer which casts into a function pointer in the future. In such way, 
PointGuard protection is bypassed. 
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2.3.12 Non-executable User Stack 
Solar Designer [Designer, 1997] proposes a runtime operating system patch against 
overflow attacks. The patch will disable any codes running in the stack. The approach covers 
the situation that the attacker's codes reside in the stack. Even if the indirect overflow attack 
succeeds, the codes will not execute. The advantage of this approach is that it does not 
change the source codes, and it applies for all the legacy codes. 
However, the disadvantages of this works are 
1. The indirect overflow attacks which overflow memories other than stack (heap 
section, for example) bypasses this protection. 
2. Some programs rely on executable stack to generate dynamic codes. Those 
programs are not protected by this protection. 
2.4 Function pointer protection 
In Section 2.3, we argued that the current protection schemes would not protect 
against indirect buffer overflow attacks efficiently and with a complete coverage. Static 
bounds checking produces a large number of false positive detections and dynamic bounds 
checking schemes incur prohibitive system overhead. PointGuard, which protects pointers, 
has a weak adversary model and it also modifies the program semantics. 
We focus on the protection of a function pointer directly. We propose a technique to 
protect function pointers allocated in any part of the memory: stack, global or heap data 
space. The main insight is to store only encrypted function pointer values into the memory 
and to decrypt them before each use (as an address or as an arithmetic value). 
The encryption/decryption functions can either be invertible, simple functions or they 
could be one-way functions for added security. 
The encryption keys are generated dynamically at runtime. Each function pointer will 
have one unique key. Consequently, it is very hard for an attacker to guess the key. 
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2.4.1 Potential function pointers 
In this section, we define the set of function pointers protected by our scheme in a 
formal way. The C language has a very powerful casting mechanism allowing any pointer, 




void (*pt)(int i); 
int i; 
i =foo; 
pt = i;} 
Notations: 
e: Type environment, V: variable, E: expression, fp:function pointer, 
pfp: potential function pointer, exp: expression type, pfpexp: pfp expression type, 
op: binary operations, 
Vtype: the type ofV, stands for that in environment e, V indicates pfp type. 
Limitations: 
The rules explain pfp propagation only. 
No validity of operations or assignments is checked. 
Type rules for pfp propagation: 
m 
e\~V: (pfpexe, e) 
e e ,  :  ( e a p , & , )  
ehE, op E2 : (pfpexp,e2) 
M 
e\~V = E: (pfpexp,e2[V K> pfp]) 
ehE x : (T x , e x )  e ,  hE 2 : (T 2 , e 2 )  
m 
Figure 2.4 PFP Propagation 
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Although there is a warning during compilation of Exl.c, GCC would still generate 
binary code for the program. If we limit the potential function pointers set to only the 
declared function pointers, our technique will not protect the variables assigned a function 
pointer through casting. An adversary could exploit this to attack the cast function pointer 
variable, for example, variable i in Exl.c. The later assignment of i topt with casting would 
not be encrypted/decrypted leaving it open to an attack. 
We define a new type, pfp, to characterize the potential function pointer bound 
variables set. The potential function pointer bound variables set initially contains only the 
declared function pointers. However, through a static type flow analysis, this type (pfp) is 
propagated. 
2.4.2 Function pointer encryption/decryption 
The basic mechanism to protect potential function pointers is encryption and 
decryption. We encrypt a potential function pointer before storing it in the memory and 
decrypt it before it is dereferenced or used in an expression. The encryption and decryption 
function should not cost too much computation time or it will not be acceptable despite the 
protection it offers. 
The easiest scheme is to choose a simple encryption and decryption function, such as 
XOR (Boolean exclusive-or) of the function pointer with a key. Hence e(fp) -fp XOR key 
and d(val) = val XOR key, where e is the encryption function and d is the decryption function. 
We talk about simple scheme in Section 2.5. 
However, the simple encryption scheme brings the concern of security vulnerability. 
If the attacker manages to know the original value and encrypted value, the key is trivial. To 
solve this problem we also implement complex scheme with a much stronger algorithm to 
protection function pointers in Section 2.6. 
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2.5 XOR encryption 
2.5.1 Key selection 
The key in XOR encryption needs to be carefully chosen. Some of the desirable 
characteristics are: 
1. Variability: The key should have a different value for each function pointer that is 
encoded/decoded for the orthogonality based robustness, wherein a compromise 
of a single value has no impact on the others. 
2. Random: The key should be hard to guess by an attacker. For each program run, it 
would be desirable to have a different key value. Any advantage derived by an 
attacker by guessing some of the keys in a given program run are completely lost 
for the future program runs (if each run chooses a different set of keys). This 
renders "incremental" attacks ineffective. A typical attack focuses on one sub-
area of the program, derives some information about it in a given run. The future 
runs then target different sub-areas of the program. The information/knowledge 
derived in each program run is additive. This is a very powerful tool available to 
an attacker. By denying this additive/increment knowledge gain property, we take 
away one of the most powerful tools available to the adversary. 
3. Invariance: The key should not change its value during a given program run so 
that each encryption and each decryption of the same function pointer sees the 
same key value (for correctness). 
We could generate random keys, one instance per function pointer for a simple 
scheme. However, it poses a large overhead to store all the keys corresponding to all the 
protected variables. This will also make it more likely for an attacker to attack the keys 
themselves. One solution may be to generate keys that are dynamically derived at the run 
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time from function pointers and program themselves. As long as we guarantee the same key 
for encryption and decryption, the program correctness can be guaranteed. 
For this scheme, we generate keys in two steps: 
1. First step, we use the address of the pointer/variable as the encryption/decryption 
key at the compile time. Hence, encryption XOR instructions such as *fpO = *fpO 
XOR addr(fpO) are generated at RTL level. This step gives us key variability. 
2. Second step, note that the address of a function pointer is a fairly weak attribute. 
An adversary with access to a similar operating system and compiler can 
reproduce the addresses of the variables within a reasonable amount of time. That 
is the reason at each run we generate a random number with the seed of process id 
and current time. This random number serves as an XOR mask. Each instance of 
an encryption instruction fp <— fp XOR addr(fp) is turned into 
fp <— fp XOR addr( fp) XOR rand( fp). 
An adversary can infer addr(fp) easily on a similar computing node which is a 
weakness of PointGuard. However, with this per run randomization, the adversary would 
have to guess 232 possible random masks (for a 32-bit architecture) in order to gain any 
useful information, which severely limits the attack space. 
2.5.2 Implementation 
We implemented the simple encryption/decryption scheme as an extension to GCC-
3.0 (GNU Compiler Collection). The idea can be applied to any other compiler equally well. 
GCC does not translate directly from high-level language into machine code but uses 
an intermediate representation called RTL (register transfer language). We patch GCC at the 
RTL abstraction layer. We change GCC source code to generate encryption and decryption 
RTL codes for function pointers. During the pass when GCC scans trees to generate RTL 
codes, we check function pointer type. If encryption or decryption is needed, we add codes to 
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generate RTL codes to implement encryption or decryption. In the following passes, GCC 
will generate machine codes for encryption and decryption according to the RTLs we 
generate. 
There are several seasons that we chose RTL level to patch: 
1. Easy to debug. GCC could generate a file that contains generated RTL codes, 
which makes it easy to check encryption and decryption codes we generate. 
2. Easy to judge variable types. Tree representations in GCC contain a rich set of 
information about the variables in the program, which makes it easy to judge if 
encryption or decryption codes need to be generated. 
3. Hard to implement in the passes after RTL generation. There is not much type 
information available at RTL level. Also after RTL generation, GCC has many 
passes to optimize the code. It is hard to implement our scheme at one of these 
passes. 
2.5.3 Security testing 
In this section, we describe the experimental setup used to validate the security 
robustness of the proposed. Consider indirect, c as an example. The original version presented 
in Figure 2.2 succeeded in overflowing the function pointer. However, after being compiled 
by our patched GCC, the program ends in segmentation fault. Let us take a look at indirect.c: 
16 buf[l] = (int)shellcode; 
J? #6»; 
At Line 1 5 ,  f p  is assigned the value foo. This value is encrypted by the pointer key of 
fp and stored in the memory. At Line 17, when fp is used to make a function call, a 
decryption is performed before the function call. However, buf[l] overflows the attacker 
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code into fp at Line 16. Thus the decrypted value, generated by XORing//) with fp key, will 
not be the starting address of function foo or attacker's code shellcode. Hence the program 
ends in Segmentation fault. 
It will be very hard for an attacker to bypass our protection scheme. The reasons are: 
1. The keys are generated dynamically at runtime. Even if the attacker reproduces 
the system on his/her own machine, the dynamic unique key generation forces 
him/her to guess 232 possible random masks in order to infer the key for each 
function pointer. Even if the attacker is able to scan the memory through format 
string attacks to read an encrypted value for a function pointer fp, they still need 
to know the un-encrypted value to be able to infer the key. Even if the key for fp 
is compromised, it does not help in attacking another function pointer. This 
orthogonality of all function pointer keys leads to a graceful, incremental 
compromise space; wherein each pointer has to be attacked separately. This 
makes the scheme very robust. 
2. If the attacker tries a brute force attack, it is likely to be too expensive to be useful. 
The fact that the attacker cannot attack the system incrementally by retaining the 
partial key information from earlier attacks due to randomized keys makes it 
impractical to mount a brute force attack within the life span of a program. 
Besides, the program will generate enough errors to attract the attention of the 
administrator. 
2.5.4 Performance 
Efficiency is another important consideration with respect to security schemes. If the 
performance overhead of a protection scheme is unacceptable, it may not be deployed despite 
its effectiveness at preventing attacks. 
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We need to assess the performance overhead of the proposed encryption/decryption 
scheme. We use Apache-1.3.22 and WebStone2.5 to quantify the scheme overhead. The 
current implementation of patched GCC-3.0 encrypts/decrypts all the function pointers or 
variables that eventually will hold a function pointer. The current implementation uses the 
function pointer address as the key. We are in the process of linker/loader modification to use 
the Boolean AND of the function pointer address and a unique random mask as the 
encryption/decryption key. Note, however, that the performance overhead of both schemes 
would be identical. Both the schemes use one exclusive-or instruction per encryption or 
decryption. The additional work pertaining to random mask generation and to and operation 
of the mask with the function pointer address is performed by the linker/loader. Hence it does 
not modify the execution time of the program directly. The Apache web server was compiled 
with our version of GCC to encrypt/decrypt function pointers. We use WebStone2.5 to test 
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Figure 2.5 WebStone Performance 
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The features that we choose to compare are server connection rate, server throughput, 
and average response time. From Figure 2.5, we can see that the scheme introduces an 
overhead of no more than 5 percent. The average appears to be about 2%. 
Other benchmarks were also used to test our scheme, specifically SPEC 95 CPU 
benchmarks. As SPEC 95 CPU benchmarks are designed to measure the processor 
performance in computer architecture, they do not seem to use too many function pointers. 
Hence we did not observe any difference in the performance of these benchmarks when 
compiled with normal GCC versus when compiled with the patched GCC. Hence, we do not 
report those results. 
2.6 RC5 encryption 
The naïve XOR encryption/decryption is certainly not enough for security purpose. If 
the countermeasure manages to obtain part of the clear texts and encrypted texts, the key is 
possible to be reversed. In current literature, many advanced encryption techniques exist to 
prevent such attacks from happening. To apply one of them here is a natural choice. 
We choose RC5 [Rivest, 1995] to encrypt/decrypt the function pointers. The main 
reason we choose RC5 is that to reach a certain level of security most of the 
encryption/decryption algorithms work on the block of data more than 64 bits. However, the 
function pointer is only 32 bits in normal Linux architecture. To pad the function to 32 bits 
and store the rest of the encrypted text into a link list is one solution for 64 bits encryption for 
function pointers. However, the solution does not sound straightforward and the link list 
itself will cost more time to build and maintain. 
RC5 has been thoroughly researched on [Kaliski et al., 1995], [Knudsen et al., 1996], 
[Biryukov et al., 1998], [Selcuk, 1998]. Although it has certain vulnerabilities, we make a 
tradeoff between the security and implementation here and choose RC5 as a 32 bits 
encryption algorithm for protection of function pointers. 
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2.6.1 RC5 
RC5 is a fast block encryption/decryption algorithm designed by Rivest on 1995. In 
this section we give a brief introduction of RC5 from [Rivest, 1995]. 
Input: 
1. 2 (o-bit registers A andB 
2. 1 key table S[0.i -1] consisting of t = 2(r +1) co -bit words. 
Encryption algorithm: 
1. /f = v4 + S[0] 
2. B = B + S[1] 
3. for i = 1 to r do 
4 .  A  =  ( ( A ® B ) < z B )  +  S [ 2 * i ] - ,  
5 .  B  =  ( ( B  ©  A ) < s :  A )  +  >S[2 * / +1]; 
Decryption algorithm: 
1. for i = r downto 1 do 
2. B = ((B-lS,[2*/ + l]»v4)©^ 
3 .  A  =  ( ( A - S [ 2 * i ] » B ) @ B  
4 .  S  =  S - 5 [ 1 ]  
5. A = A — S[ 0] 
Notice that <K » are cyclic left/right rotations. Also, if the size of key table is larger 
than the user secret key, a routine exists to expand the user secret key into the key table. 
However, we will mention that we create random key table from the beginning so the 
expanding routine is not needed. 
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2.6.2 Implementation 
To implement RC5 encryption/decryption for function pointers, we modify enhanced 
GCC-3.0 [Zhu et al, 2004] of the simple function pointer protection. We implemented RC5-
16/16/36 where: 
1. Word size a> = 16 
2. Number of rounds r = 16 
3. Number of bytes in the secret key b = 36 
The target is still the potential function pointer set. Every time a potential function 
pointer is used, the address will be sent to a monitor function for encryption/decryption. 
The secret key is generated by random process with the seed derived from the present 
time and the current pid. Then the program will run a loop to generate 36 bytes secret key. 
2.6.3 Result 
We take the following simple program as one example: 
#include <stdio.h> 
static voidfoo(int *zzz(int)); 
static voidfoo 1 (register char); 
int main(){ 
int (*p)(int i); 
int (*q)(int i); 
intj; 
q  = f o o l ;  
p = q; 
} 
static voidfoo(int *zzz(int)) { 
printf("H%x \n zzz); 
zzzf//-
; 




Compiled with a normal gcc, the program runs as follows: 
infool 
80483de stands for the address of function fool. 
Compiling with a enhanced gcc with rc5 support, we have the following output 
during compilation: 
In zPro | main \ zOption = 1 \ zlnMonitor Function = -1 
Propagation count: 0 
zPostModifyExpr \ Encryption | For Ihs \ Static PFP Count = 1 
zEXPAND_EXPR_Normal Value \ Static PFP Count = 2 
zEXPAND EXPR Normal Value \ Static PFP Count = 3 
zPostModifyExpr | Encryption \ For Ihs | Static PFP Count = 4 
zEXPAND_EXPR_Normal Value \ Static PFP Count = 5 
zEXPAND_EXPR_Normal_Value j Static PFP Count = 6 
InzPro | foo | zOption = 1 | zlnMonitorFunction = -1 
Propagation count: 0 
zlnitialize \ Eecrypt PARM DECL, zzz \ Static PFP Count = 7 
zEXPAND_EXPR_Normal_Value | Static PFP Count = 8 
zEXPAND_EXPR_Normal_Value | Static PFP Count = 9 
zEXPAND_EXPR_Normal_Value \ Static PFP Count = 10 
zEXPAND EXPR Normal Value | Static PFP Count = 11 
In zPro \fool \ zOption = 1 | zlnMonitor Function = -1 
Propagation count: 0 
Notice that the static PFP count reaches 11 which mean that totally 11 
encryption/decryption actions are inserted into the program. There exists no propagation in 
the program such that the propagation count is 0. 
The program runs and gives the following result: 
The key: 4e9e2a87 64e24e85 Ia473c22 65f2112a 4f95a04b lOlcclce 4ecbc5c4 
7#(%74P7 37&W79 4&#7470 J47/M3J 
1, (main, q, 10, Encryption) 
zPostModifyExpr \ Encryption \ For Ihs 
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Encryption: Old = 0804885b 
New = lddf40bf 
2, (main, q, 11, Decryption) 
zEXPAND _EXPR_Normal_ Value 
Decryption: Old = lddf40bf 
New = 0804885b 
3, (main, q, 11, Encryption) 
zEXPAND_EXPR_Normal_ Value 
Encryption: Old = 0804885b 
New = lddf40bf 
4, (main, p, 11, Encryption) 
zPostModifyExpr | Encryption | For 
Encryption: Old = 0804885b 
New = lddf40bf 
5, (main, p, 12, Decryption) 
zEXPAND_EXPR_Normal_ Value 
Decryption: Old = lddf40bf 
New = 0804885b 
6, (main, p, 12, Encryption) 
zEXPAND _EXPR_Normal_ Value 
Encryption: Old = 0804885b 
New = lddf40bf 
7, (foo, * 17, Encryption) 
zlnitialize \ Eecrypt PARM DECL, 
Encryption: Old = 0804885b 
New = lddf40bf 
8, (foo, * 17, Decryption) 
zEXPAND _EXPR_Normal_ Value 
Decryption: Old = lddf40bf 
New = 0804885b 
9, (foo, *, 17, Encryption) 
zEXPAND_EXPR_Normal_ Value 
Encryption: Old = 0804885b 
New = lddf40bf 
10, (foo, *, 18, Decryption) 
zEXPAND_EXPR_Normal_ Value 
Decryption: Old = lddffObf 
New = 0804885b 
11, (foo, *, 18, Encryption) 
zEXPAND EXPR_Normal_ Value 
Encryption: Old = 0804885b 




Due to the complexity of GCC compiler and limitation of the time to submit this 
thesis, we do not compile apache web server using RC5 enhanced GCC compiler. However, 
we provide an estimated system overhead here. We run the RC5 encryption and XOR 
encryption program with Unix shell command 'time' and get the result that RC5 encryption 
will bring about 20 times overhead against XOR encryption. 
We use the following formula to estimate the overhead for RC5 encryption: 
Overhead^ = 20,  Overhead l o s  xlQ0 
20 x OverheadX0R +(100- OverheadX0R ) 
With this formula, we use the experimental data from Figure 2.5 to calculate the 
estimated overhead of RC5. From Table 2.1 we can see that the estimated overhead brought 
by RC5 protection of function pointers is no more than 15%. RC5 protection brings more 
system overhead than XOR protection. However, 15% is still acceptable for a complete 
protection of function pointers by RC5 encryption. 
Table 2.1 RC5 Encryption Overhead Estimation 
Test Server Connection Rate Server Throughput Average Response Delay Delay Time Delay 
1 1.218329084 1.125592417 4.545454545 
2 0.537125498 0.860730916 0 
3 0.500098273 0.347753512 1.538461538 
4 0.518699329 -0.206810975 0 
5 -0.440874765 0.095264017 -0.917431193 
6 0.262061262 -0.589121798 0.78125 
7 0.36310358 0 0.675675676 
8 0.723162404 0.148228002 2.409638554 
9 0.038009164 -0.013491635 0.529100529 
10 0.98366157 0.50993022 0.4784689 
11 1.068948205 1.300424628 0.873362445 
12 0.223163076 -0.013399437 -0.401606426 
13 0.422640259 0.480128034 0.373134328 
XOR Average 0.493702072 0.311171377 0.837346838 
RC5 Average 9.027254351 5.876022063 14.4482754 
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2.7 Conclusion and future work 
We describe a scheme to protect against buffer overflow attacks on function pointers. 
The scheme encrypts any variable that is either a declared function pointer or can be assigned 
a function pointer value through casting before storing it in memory. Similarly, each use of 
such a variable is decrypted. The encryption and decryption instructions are inserted by the 
compiler (GCC in our case). The implemented encryption/decryption scheme is very low 
cost exclusive-or instruction. The function pointer value is encrypted with a key. 
For simple scheme, the keys are designed to be robust in many ways. First, each 
function pointer has its own unique key. This isolates the damage through compromise of a 
given function pointer key only to that function pointer. Second, a different, random set of 
keys are chosen for each program run. 
For complex scheme, we implement RC5 encryption protection of function pointers 
with dynamic key for each run. 
The dynamic key limits the damage from a key compromise in a given program run 
only to that run. Any compromised key values do not help the adversary in any of the future 
program runs. 
In summary, our scheme defends against buffer overflow attacks via pointers. The 
protection targets pointers instead of stack resident return addresses. We protect all pointers 
regardless of their location (stack, heap or global static data space) from buffer overflow 
attacks. The proposed scheme has a performance overload of at most 5% (average of 2%) 
for simple scheme. Since each pointer key is unique and is randomized for each run through 
an augmented loader/linker, the attacker needs to be able to mount a 232 iteration attack on 
each key within a single run of the program, which appears to be extremely infeasible. The 
future works include the following. 
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2.8.1 Hidden key 
The current scheme uses the addresses related to the program as 
encryption/decryption key. This could be vulnerable if the hacker is able to see those 
addresses in the memory during run time. 
A hidden system key may be the solution. Design of a system key that is invisible to 
the software (perhaps architecturally invisible) is a challenging task. This type of program 
transparent support for a key might have to be a complete micro-architectural scheme. The 
function calls could be encrypted and decrypted with that hidden key but the attacker does 
not see the key, since it is not in the memory. 
2.8.2 Dynamic linking 
The current scheme assumes that all the files with protected function pointers are 
compiled with the patched GCC and are linked statically. However, dynamic linking creates 
new challenges, since which of the variables in a linked program are PC-bound may not be 
determinable until after linking. Consider a procedure where one of the actual parameters is 
cast as a function pointer. The calling program will never tag any computations leading up to 
that actual parameter as PC-bound. Similarly, if a function pointer is cast as an integer or 
other non-pointer value, and then passed to a procedure as an actual parameter, the called 
procedure does not have any way of knowing it until after linking. Linker-based techniques 
could be developed to account for these cases. 
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CHAPTER 3. CONTROL FLOW CHECKING AUTOMATA 
In Chapter 2, we introduce a compiler patch to protect function pointers against 
overflow attacks at runtime. In this chapter, we take a different path to fight against overflow 
attacks: program level trust through control flow checking automata. The notion of trust has 
traditionally been deployed at transaction level in order to bypass expensive security checks. 
We extend the trust model to individual programs. Moreover, we develop a self 
assessment/monitoring framework for trust based on control flow integrity that can be 
incorporated into a compiler. We also extend the concept of Schneider's enforceable security 
policy into that of an enforceable trust policy. This trust assessment model has been 
implemented with SUIF and GCC compilers. An architectural modification to support 
efficient management of control flow integrity based trust model has also been developed. 
The trust value indicates how well the runtime program behavior match the control flow 
graph derived from source codes. The overflow attacks within codes are detected with low 
threshold of trust level. 
3.1 Introduction 
Trust has become a central tenet in the world of network driven computing. There are 
many definitions of trust highlighting different aspects of a trust model and management 
[Abdul-Rahman et al., 1997] [Chen et al., 2000] [Khare et al., 1997] [Blaze et al., 1996] 
[Blaze et al., 1999]. Some strive to build a model of authenticated accesses [Li et al., 2003]. 
Some develop a model of trust propagation such as the Trusted Third Party model. The 
Microsoft's trusted zone model to bypass the sandboxing for the JAVA virtual machine is yet 
another example of trust where user is asked to specify the trust value. One of the 
shortcomings in these trust frameworks is that the "trust value" is static with respect to 
evolving security attacks on the constituent nodes. In other words, the trust value is derived 
solely from the history of the node behavior within the context of the transaction under 
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consideration. However, the other aspects of the program behavior relating to that node can 
provide valuable information about its trustworthiness. For instance, if a trusted certificate 
server has been compromised, its trustworthiness should decline. Even if there is only an 
indication of a footprint of an attack, it ought to play a role in determining its trustworthiness. 
There is no current mechanism to incorporate such dynamic information into the trusted 
transactions. The trust in such a server may decline over time due to a projection of its 
compromised behavior at the transaction level, but that could be a long latency feedback loop. 
In this chapter, we describe a technique to generate a dynamic trust level from the 
runtime behavior of a program to reflect how well the program runtime states comply with a 
pre-specified trust policy. The trust policy could initialize the trust level to 1, which will be 
lowered if the program behavior deviates from the expected (trusted) behavior. 
We take the viewpoint that trust is meaningful only when specified within the context 
of a security policy. If a certain security policy is routinely respected (such as always 
authenticating before a critical resource allocation step), our trust with respect to that policy 
ought to be high. Such a high trust value permits us to eschew explicit verification of this 
security policy each and every time. For each security policy, there is a corresponding trust 
value. Hence trust is a multidimensional attribute with each security policy corresponding to 
a dimension. Although, our discussion so far has related trust with a security policy, the 
concept really holds with respect to any program level correctness policy. For instance, the 
compliance of a program to a policy that states that each object should be freed after its last 
use can be captured with a trust value corresponding to this policy. We present a formal 
definition of trust policy, trust automata and a primitive implementation of program level 
trust in this chapter. 
Schneider [Schneider, 2000] defines a security policy as a set of unacceptable 
executions with respect to the runtime behavior of a program. He also defines a class of 
security policies named "Execution Monitoring", which are the security policies that could 
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be enforced by execution monitoring. Schneider uses security automata, which are non-
deterministic finite-state automata, to describe security policies. When the program execution 
behavior is not accepted by the security automata, the program is terminated. 
Instead of terminating the program, we are more interested in assessing the program 
execution state with respect to its trustworthiness. Towards this end, we introduce the notion 
of a trust policy. A trust policy describes the acceptable actions of the program execution. It 
also associates a trust function with each transition/action. Note that typically we monitor 
only a small subset of actions within a program. Those actions are the only ones that 
constitute the input to such a trust policy. The trust policy is defined as follows: 
Definition of trust policy: Trust policy is specified by a predicate on sets of executions and a 
trust function associated with program actions. 
A runtime monitor will compare program runtime behavior against a trust policy and 
execute the corresponding updates to the trust value, which represents the trust level of the 
program. This program level trust could serve many roles. It could be supplied to an upper 
level control process to formulate a more refined response (a low trust value could lead to the 
invocation of an intrusion detection system). Alternately, the program level trust values could 
constitute the primary input into a transaction level trust management framework for 
traditional trust management. 
The program level trust is a dynamic, runtime value to capture the degree of 
compliance of the program execution with the trust policy. We argue that the program level 
trust should have the following features to reflect the trust level of a single program: 
1. The process to generate program level trust cannot be compromised. Else the trust 
value itself is not trustworthy. 
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2. The program level trust should be updated according to the trust policy and 
runtime state. When the program is compromised, the trust level should be lower 
than a pre-specified threshold. Whenever the trust level is lower than this 
threshold, an alert can be issued to the system administrator. 
3. The computational overhead of trust value maintenance should be tolerable. 
There are many ways to implement a trust monitoring system. The two interesting 
points are when the monitoring process is implemented as a separate process from the 
monitored program or when it is embedded into the monitored program. We must guarantee 
the three features of program level trust mentioned earlier regardless of the implementation 
choice, however, to ensure the robustness of the trust results. In this chapter, we present a 
primitive implementation which embeds the trust automata and corresponding monitor into 
the program. Moreover, the trust policies on an arbitrary program state are translated into 
trust policies on the program control flow graph. 
We discuss trust automata in Section 3.2. Embedded implementation of program level 
trust will be presented in Section 3.3. We outline related work in Section 3.4 and future work 
in Section 3.5 respectively. We conclude in Section 3.6. 
3.2 Trust automata 
Schneider [Schneider, 2000] uses "Buchi automata", which basically has the power of 
deterministic finite-state automata, to express security policies. 
Deterministic finite automata are simple and powerful enough for many security 
policies, like access control. However, a trust policy to describe acceptable program 
behaviors can either focus on the space of program actions such as access to shared resources 
or could be based on the low level program execution attributes (such as return address 
integrity). A deterministic finite automaton is not powerful enough to capture the execution 
attributes. Take the trust policies that are related to runtime stack as one example: 
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Trust policy of inter-procedural control flow graph: This trust policy states that only the 
program specified procedure call and return events can be instantiated at the runtime. 
Program function calls consistent with the control flow graph will increase the trust level of 
the program. Program function calls not from the control flow graph will decrease the trust 
level. 
This trust policy generates a trust value that reflects how well the program runtime 
behavior complies with the inter-procedural control flow graph. In order to observe and track 
the program control flow, and to compare against control flow graph generated from the 
program source code, the trust monitor needs access to a function call stack to track all the 
function calls and returns. Deterministic finite automata are not suitable for this task. 
The trust automata can come in two flavors based on the computational complexity of 
the policy. A DFA like trust automata can verify trust policies based on security policies 
verifiable with Schneider's security automata [Schneider, 2000]. In general such policies 
specify relative sequencing of two events: An event of type P must occur before an event of 
type Q can occur. A more general version can be a finite precedence graph over a class of 
events which are easily formulated as a DFA. We choose to present pushdown automata as 
the basic trust automata due to their expressive power. The reader should keep in mind 
though that should the security policy be simple enough to be captured by a DFA, we intend 
the trust automata implementation to be a DFA from efficiency considerations. Pushdown 
automata are powerful enough to describe program runtime behavior. Y et pushdown 
automata are simple enough to be verified formally. 
Notice that pushdown automata which use infinitely many stacks are not practical for 
real computer programs. So we restrict the trust automata to a subset of pushdown automata: 
deterministic pushdown automata. 
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P  =  ( t ,  Q ,  2, r, S ,  / ,  q 0 , Z 0 , F ) ,  where 
t: The trust varaible in range [0,1], with 1 standing for 
fully trusted and 0 for totally distrusted. 
Q : A finite set of states; 
S : A finite set of input symbols; 
T : A finite stack alphabet; 
ô  : The transition function, S ( q ,  a ,  X ) ,  where q  e Q ,  
a E {s} U 2, X G F; The output of S is a finite set 
of pairs (p, y, f) where p is the new state, y is 
the string of stack symbols that replaces X at the 
top of the stack, 
/ : [0,1] —» [0,1], For each transition, the automata 
will update t  < —  / ( / ) .  
q0 : The start state. 
Z0 : The start symbol. 
F : The set of accepting states. 
Also, the trust automata satisfy the following conditions in order to be deterministic 
pushdown automata: 
1.  S ( q ,  a ,  X )  has at most one member for any q  in Q ,  
a in S or a - £, andX in F. 
2. If 5 ( q ,  a ,  X )  is nonempty, for some a  in E, then 
ô(q, s, X) must be empty. 
When the program runs and the program states trigger the input to the trust automaton, 
which resides in a monitor or embedded code, the trust value of the program will be updated. 
When the trust value of the program is too low, an alert will be issued to raise 
attention and some of the undesirable program behaviors might be suppressed. A simple alert 
raising mechanism is to raise a specific exception. 
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3.3 Embedded framework 
As we mentioned earlier, there are two possible implementations for program level 
trust assessment and monitoring frameworks. In this section, we present a primitive 
embedded monitor framework for program level trust. As trust level should be lowered if the 
program behavior deviates from the trusted behavior defined by trust policy, a clear 
expectation as to the power of the adversary is desirable. If the adversary has the full control 
of the program, the trust process cannot generate a trustable program level trust. We assume 
that the adversary could access the computer from network and may have the ability to 
overflow buffers in the global data and stack portions of memory but not within the source 
code (text) area of memory. 
As we implement the current framework with embedded codes, we assume that the 
program control flow change will happen within the source codes. If an attacker manages to 
jump outside the codes of the current execution, the trust automata will not execute and the 
trust value is invalid. We demonstrate one example in Section 3.3.3. 
3.3.1 Trust policy of control flow graph 
Trust policy of control flow graph: The program control flow actions (entering and leaving 
basic block) consistent with the statically derived control flow graph will increase the trust 
level of the program. All the other actions will decrease the trust level of the program. 
This trust policy arises in the traditional fault tolerance community [Oh et al., 2002]. 
If a processor or system level hardware fault tampers the program behavior causing 
unexpected control flow to be instantiated, such a policy will lower our trust in those faulty 
executions. This may be of value to safety-critical applications such as flight control. 
Trust policy of control flow graph has a close relationship with the control flow graph 
generated from the program source code. 
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A control flow graph is defined as G  =  ( V , E )  , where V  =  { V j , . . . ,  v n  } is a finite 
set of nodes and E a V x F is a set of directed edges between nodes. 
We assume that G is a complete control flow graph which not only represents the 
intra-procedural control flow but also inter-procedural control flow. A call to another 
function corresponds to an edge from the block of call instruction in the caller procedure to 
the first block of the callee procedure, and another edge from the exit block of callee 
procedure to the successor block of call instruction in the caller procedure. 
We define the trust automata of control flow graph as: 
P  =  i f ,  Q ,  E, T, S ,  f ,  q 0 , Z 0 , F ) ,  where 
t: [0,1] 
8: r 
I :  {  E n ( v )  v  e  V ,  E n ( n ) represents program action of entering block v} 
T : NULL 
:  {  ( v , , - >  |  ( v , ,  V ; )  e  ^  )  
/ : t <— t, when (v,, En(v2 )) —» v2 G S; t <— 0.9 * t, otherwise. 
q0 : En[v0 ] where v0 is the first block in mainÇ). 
Z0 : The start symbol. 
F : Final states 
Now we will discuss the detailed implementation of this trust automaton in embedded 
framework. 
3.3.1.1 Implementation 
Control flow checking in essence verifies at run time that a monitored control flow 
edge is indeed instantiated as intended (from its source basic block to its target basic block). 
Such control flow checking applied to each control flow edge has been used for processor 
fault tolerance [Oh et al., 2002]. We, however, recognize that security automata [Schneider, 
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2000] and edit automata [Ligatti et al., 2003] can also be formulated as control flow path 
monitoring paradigms. This allows us to treat basic program structure violations such as 
buffer overflow with the same control flow integrity verification technique as a transaction 
level property. We first outline the control flow signature framework. 
Property (1) : 
Assumeparentiy.) = {vy | v e V A ( V . ,  V . )  e E}, 
then Vvo,v4 e V(parent(vJ n parent(vh) = 0) 
// BB v with ID 
H GR = ID. 
II BB v with ID 
IID . = ID ® ID 
GR = GR®D 
Figure 3.1 Basic Block with One Parent 
[Oh et al., 2002] proposed to use control flow signatures for fault tolerance in a 
processor. Each basic block i in the program have a unique IDi associated with it. There is a 
global signature register GR. The invariant is that after the initial signature book-keeping at 
entry into a basic block, the global signature register GR should contain the ID of this basic 
block IDi. 
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II BB v with ID, 
II GR = ZD, 
GR = GR © D, 
// BB v. with ID 
II GR = ID 
GR = GR® D 
II BB v with ID 
UD . = ID © ID 
GR = GR © DxJ 
i f ( G R  !  =  / D )  
/  =  0.9*/  
Figure 3.2 Basic Block with Multiple Parents 
Figure 3.3 CFG Modification 
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The basic algorithms for signature verification are presented in Figure 3.1 and Figure 
3.2. The Dtj and Dxj are embedded into source codes by compiler. When entering main, the 
GR is initialized to be IDv0. Notice that in the multiple parents' situation, IDx comes from 
vx which is a randomly chosen parent from the parent set of v.. However, when a block has 
multiple parents, and those parents have multiple children, we cannot fix uniquely the 
randomly chosen parent as a distinguished node because one parent set can have only one 
chosen parent. If a node belongs to two parent sets and they have different distinguished 
chosen parents, a conflict will arise when it computes. That is the reason we enforce the 
following restrictions on the control flow graph. 
For a trust automaton of control flow graph to be embeddable into program source 
code, the control flow graph has to satisfy: 
Modifications to control flow graph are necessary if the original control flow graph 
does not satisfy Property (1). As shown in Figure 3.3, when the control flow graph does not 
satisfy Property (1), we will insert one extra level of dummy nodes to erase the conflict. 
With the modification technique of Figure 3.3, we are able to turn a security 
automaton into an equivalent automaton that could be embedded into program. 
3.3.1.2 Experimental results 
The C compiler gcc-3.3 has been modified to embed CFC automata. During compile 
time, we add passes to: 
1. Generate unique ID for each basic block. 
2. Collect information on inter-procedure calls. 
3. Embed control flow checking codes into the program. 
During runtime, the program will: 
1. Initialize global registers for checking algorithm. 
2. Initialize the ID set for inter-procedure calls. 
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3. Check the control flow at the beginning of each block. 
Overhead 
The control flow checking algorithm will increase the program size and run time 
dramatically. We have compiled two of the SPEC2000 benchmark programs: gzip and mcf to 
evaluate the dynamic run time overhead. The data is presented in Tables 3.1, 3.2. Notice: 
1. Block number and instruction number in the table 1 show the increased program 
size by using patched gcc-3.3. 
2. The run 1 in table 3.2 is when the program compiled by un-patched gcc-3.3 and 
run 2 in table 3.2 with program compiled by patched gcc-3.3 to generate full 
control flow checking. 
It is expected that the system overhead for complete control flow checking will be 
large since each control flow edge is checked. Note though that this is an upper bound on the 
trust monitoring overhead. Almost any other realistic trust policy will monitor a much 
smaller subset of control flow edges. Appropriate hardware support, such as the one 
proposed by [Zhang et al., 2004], is necessary for bringing down the overhead to a 
reasonable value. 
Note that for each security automaton, one set of signature space needs to be 
maintained. Not every control edge needs to be verified, however, as was the case for the 
trust policy of control flow checking. The performance overhead can be significantly reduced 
if however the architecture manages the trust attributes. 
Table 3.1 SPEC 2000 Benchmarks static count 
Program Old Block New Block Old Insn New Insn 
gzip 1730 3945 17429 73047 
mcf 395 962 4565 17397 
47 
Table 3.2 SPEC 2000 Benchmarks runtime overhead 
Program Ref. Time Run 1 Run 2 Ration 
gzip 1400 202 11969 59.2 
mcf 1800 477 1611 3 
Architecture Level Signature Checking 
One simple way to accomplish this would be to associate extra attributes with branch 
instructions. This is under the assumption that each program object that triggers trust 
evaluation will be a multiple of basic blocks, which appears to be a reasonable assumption. 
Most trust policies are defined at the granularity of procedures or larger objects. A special 
branch instruction in addition to performing the branching operation would also specify the 
difference value D, and the entry basic block's unique ID. Note that the hardware trust engine 
maintains a current global signature GR. The D part of the branch instruction will be 
EXORed with GR to give GR - GR © DR for a taken branch. The hardwired comparison of 
the resulting GR with respect to the basic block ID embedded in the branch instruction can 
also be efficient. If the check fails, this hardware trust unit can raise an exception. 
Consider Figure 3.4 which shows a schematic for the proposed architecture. The 
modified branch instructions have the form: begs R0, Rl, target, Dt, IDt, Dnt, IDnl. This is a 
signature checking equivalent of the traditional "branch on equal" ibeq) of MIPS like 
instruction set. It branches to the basic block at address given by PC+target for a taken 
branch, and to PC+4 for a not taken branch. In addition to the arguments of the traditional 
branch, it also specifies the difference value and the ID of the block on a taken branch 










D 1 ID 
EXOR 
GR 
Branch Unit / Trust Engine 
Figure 3.4 Trust Engine Support Architecture 
Note that these values are known to the compiler at compile time, and hence it is 
feasible to generate instructions embedding these values. One multiplexer selects one of the 
difference values Dt or Dm on the basis of the branch direction. Another one selects the ID 
from IDt and lDm. The D value is EXORed with the existing global register value GR, which 
replaces the current value of GR. The multiplexed ID value is compared against this GR 
value. If they are not equal, an exception is raised. 
We plan to implement such a trust engine as part of SimpleScalar [Burger et al., 1996] 
simulator. 
3.3.2 Electronic commerce examples 
Trust policy could come from security policy, though security policy defines the 
executions that are unacceptable. Trust policy defines trust function for both acceptable and 
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unacceptable actions in order to determine the final program level trust. It is pretty simple to 
turn a security automaton into a trust automaton. 
Note that in order for the trust automata to be embeddable into program source code, 
they have to satisfy Property (1). The transformation in Figure 3.3 could be used to modify 
trust automata into embeddable automata. 
In this section, we take one simple example and one example from Schneider's 
security automata [Schneider, 2000] to demonstrate the conversion of normal security 
automata into trust automata. Note that these examples use DFA like structures for the policy 
specification instead of push-down automata like structures. In practice, most of the 
examples in the literature seem to require only a DFA level of expressiveness. We defined 
trust automata to be PDA like for more expressiveness. 
Example 1 
Consider a security policy that the program can not write to the critical data unless it 




Figure 3.5 Critical Data Access after Verification 
We could transform this security policy into a trust policy as follows. 
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P  =  ( t ,  Q ,  S, T, S ,  / ,  q 0 , Z 0 ,  F ) ,  where 
t: [0,1] 
8: Wo,9i} 
r : NULL 
ô  :  {  ( q 0 ,  O t h e r A c t i o n )  — >  q 0 ,  ( q 0 ,  V E R I F Y )  - >  q x ,  
( q } ,  O t h e r A c t i o n )  — >  q x ,  ( q x ,  V E R I F Y )  — »  g , ,  
(?,, MW7E) -»9i } 
/ : t <— t, for transitions in S; 
t <— 0.1 * t, otherwise. 
1o • %• 
Z0 : The start symbol. 
F : Final states 
If the trust policy is violated, the trust level of the program will drop dramatically. 
Each violation decreases the trust value to one tenth of its original value. A low enough trust 
value will alert the administrator or manager program for further action. Also note that these 
examples start with an initial trust value of 1. This is an appropriate initial state when the 
program was written by a trusted source, and the host node is safe except for external attacks. 
In other words, external attacks or programming bugs are the only causes that will lower the 
trustworthiness of these programs over time. On the other hand, if the program under 
consideration is a distributed transaction, or if it is acquired from a non-trustworthy source 
(such as a downloaded Java applet), an initial trust value of 0 will be more appropriate. 
Example 2 
The security automaton in Figure 3.6 comes from Schneider's Execution Monitoring 
paper [Schneider, 2000]. It specifies that there can be no send action after a file read action 
has been performed. This security policy could prevent information leakage. 
51 
When the program starts, the automaton enters state q n f r . If there is a FileRead action, 
the automaton enters state qnfr and prevents further Send actions. 
not FileRead not Send 
FileRead 
Figure 3.6 No Send after FileRead 
We turn this security automaton into a trust automaton as follows. 
P  =  0, Q ,  S,T, 8 , f ,  q Q , Z 0 ,  F ) ,  where 
t: [0,1] 
8: {9o,9i} 
S : { FileRead, Send, OtherAction } 
T : NULL 
8  :  {  ( q Q ,  O t h e r A c t i o n )  — >  q 0 ,  ( q 0 ,  F i l e R e a d )  - >  q x ,  
( q Q ,  S e n d )  - >  q Q ,  ( q x ,  O t h e r A c t i o n )  - >  q { ,  
(qx, FileRead) -> qx } 
/ : / < — / ,  f o r  t r a n s i t i o n s  i n  
t <r- 0.1*?,otherwise. 
9o-
Zo : The start symbol. 
F : Final states 
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In this example as well, if the trust policy is violated, the trust level of the program 
drops to one tenth its original value. A low enough trust value will alert the administrator or 
manager program for further action. 
3.3.3 Program control flow violation examples 
In this section we present a simple example of the program control flow violations. 
The program control flow violation within the program could happen when the function 
pointer is overflowed. Another case is that a user might modify the program source codes to 
bypass certain verification checks. 
Take a look into the following program: 
01 #include <stdio.h> 
02 voidfoo(int in){ 
03 printfC'foo: ===> %d\n", in); 
04 } 
05 void bar(int in){ 
06 if > 2) / 
07 printfÇ'koo: ==> in > 2\ri); 
04 
09 printfÇ'koo: ==> in <= 2\n "); 
10 goto end; 
11 } 
12 printfÇ'koo: ==> After comparing. \n "); 
13 end: printfÇ'koo: ==> End.W); 
14 } 
15 int main(int argc, char **argv){ 
16 int a; 
17 a = argc * 10; 
18 




23 printfÇ'main ==> DoneXn"); 
24 } 
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The running result of our embedded implementation looks like: 
In Out Index zID 
-7 0 0 2044&977(% 
In Out Index zID 
0 0 4 7967J73926 
In Out Index zID 
0 1 I 1365180540 
In Out Index zID 
-7 0 0 79J774779J 
In Out Index zID 
0 0 J 4242JgjjJ 
In Out Index zID 
0 V 2 J96J76649 
koo: ==> in <= 2 
In Out Index zID 
7 0 2 J96J76649 
In Out Index zID 
0 0 g 7749647427 
In Out Index zID 
0 7 4 73J0490027 
koo: ==> End. 
In Out Index zID 
7 0 4 73J04P0027 
In Out Index zID 
0 0 9 7<Mj6#690 
In Out Index zID 
0 -1 6 1102520059 
In Out Index zID 
7 0 7 736J7&0J40 
In Out Index zID 
0 0 6 7J403&3426 
In Out Index zID 
0 7 3 7j034JJ7.M 
main ==> Done. 
In Out Index zID 
7 0 j 7j034JJ736 
In Out Index zID 
0 0 7 3J00J277 
In Out Index zID 
0 - 7  J  J 2 7 J 9 J 3 6 &  
zd zD zFuncName zCurFuncName zRuntimeCount 
-1 0 NULL main 1 
zd zD zFuncName zCurFuncName zRuntimeCount 
272249707 0 NULL main 2 
zd zD zFuncName zCurFuncName zRuntimeCount 
60J747370 0 bar main 3 
zd zD zFuncName z CurFuncName zRuntimeCount 
-1 0 NULL bar 4 
zd zD zFuncName zCurFuncName zRuntimeCount 
7&4j067PJ0 0 NULL bar 5 
zd zD zFuncName zCurFuncName zRuntimeCount 
946737JJ4 0 printf bar 6 
zd zD zFuncName zCurFuncName zRuntimeCount 
946737JJ4 0 printf bar 7 
zd zD zFuncName zCurFuncName zRuntimeCount 
7707209060 2079JJ27J7 M/72 bar 8 
zd zD zFuncName zCurFuncName zRuntimeCount 
7&?Jj72j0J 0 printf bar 9 
zd zD zFuncName zCurFuncName zRuntimeCount 
7<MJ372j0J 0 printf bar 10 
zd zD zFuncName zCurFuncName zRuntimeCount 
2727JJJ6J7 0 NULL bar 11 
zd zD zFuncName zCurFuncName zRuntimeCount 
7<M26&&527 -1 NULL bar 12 
zd zD zFuncName zCurFuncName zRuntimeCount 
zd 


































Congratulations for passing all CFG tests! 
If we change the control flow within the current program at line 10 to jump to line 12 
instead of 13, the embedded trust automata will generate the following warning: 
In Out Index 
- 1 0  0  
In Out Index 
0 0 4 
In Out Index 
0 1 1 
In Out Index 















































In Out Index zID zd zD zFuncName zCurFuncName zRuntimeCount 
0 0 J 42423433J 744J067PJ0 0 NULL bar 5 
In Out Index zID zd zD zFuncName zCurFuncName zRuntimeCount 
0 7 2 JP6J7664P P46737JJ4 0 printf bar 6 
koo: ==> in <= 2 
In Out Index zID zd zD zFuncName zCurFuncName zRuntimeCount 
7 0 2 JP6J7664P P46737JJ4 0 printf bar 7 
In Out Index zID zd zD zFuncName zCurFuncName zRuntimeCount 
0 0 4 7749647427 7707209060 207Pj327J7 NULL bar 8 
In Out Index zID zd zD zFuncName zCurFuncName zRuntimeCount 
0 1 3 702J202362 7JP&P47474 0 printf bar 9 
zError: zCurID=1649760492, zID=1025202362, zTrust=0.900000. Normal check fails, 
koo: ==> After comparing. 
In Out Index zID zd zD zFuncName zCurFuncName zRuntimeCount 
1 0 3 702J202362 7J&9P47474 0 printf bar 10 
In Out Index zID zd zD zFuncName zCurFuncName zRuntimeCount 
0 7 4 73J04P0027 743J37230j 0 printf bar 11 
koo: ==> End. 
In Out Index zID zd zD zFuncName zCurFuncName zRuntimeCount 
7 0 4 73J0490027 743J37230J 0 printf bar 12 
In Out Index zID zd zD zFuncName zCurFuncName zRuntimeCount 
O O P  7&33646P0 2727J336J7 0 NULL bar 13 
In Out Index zID zd zD zFuncName zCurFuncName zRuntimeCount 
0 - 1  6  7702J200JP 74626&9J27 -1 NULL bar 14 
In Out Index zID zd zD zFuncName zCurFuncName zRuntimeCount 
1 0 1 736J7&0J40 60J747370 0 bar main 15 
In Out Index zID zd zD zFuncName zCurFuncName zRuntimeCount 
0 0 6 7J40343426 77776P046 72404P26P4 maw 76 
In Out Index zID zd zD zFuncName z CurFuncName zRuntimeCount 
0 7 3 73034JJ736 76033J0444 0 printf main 17 
main ==> Done. 
In Out Index zID zd zD zFuncName zCurFuncName zRuntimeCount 
7 0 3 73034jJ736 76033J0444 0 printf main 18 
In Out Index zID zd zD zFuncName zCurFuncName zRuntimeCount 
0 0 7 35005211 733634J427 0 NULL main 19 
In Out Index zID zd zD zFuncName zCurFuncName zRuntimeCount 
0 - 1  5  J27JP.536& 4&6JP727P -1 NULL main 20 
Warning : The trust value is lower than 1 ! 
3.4 Support for traditional trust management 
Blaze et al introduce the term "trust management" in their classical paper [Blaze et al., 
1999]. 
The program level trust could be a fundamental supplement for the study of trust 
management. Traditional trust management mainly focuses on the trust propagation [Blaze et 
al, 1999]. The trust levels remain static once the trust relationships have been built, and the 
network structure remains the same. The program level trust, on the other hand, dynamically 
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generates the trust estimate for the runtime processes. The leaf level predicates within 
propositions capturing the system level trust are often the trustworthiness attributes of a 
program. If the dynamic trust value estimates arising from our implementations of program 
level trust are continually accounted for in the transaction level trust engine, we could have a 
more correct dynamic trust estimation framework at system and/or transaction level. Note 
that system level trust engine could use any algorithm for trust propagation (not necessarily 
logic based). The main point to note is that a dynamic program level trust will be reflected in 
a dynamic system level trust relationship if periodic re-evaluations are undertaken. In fact, a 
system or transaction level trust automata can capture many of the commonly deployed 
system level trust management algorithms. 
We illustrate a real example of combining various program level trust values with a 
specific trust propagation algorithm from Jasang [Jsang, 1999]. This demonstrates the power 
of our model in formal specification and propagation of system level trust. Here certain 
criteria are explained thus eventually leading to a foregone conclusion. 
3.4.1 Trust algebra 
Josang [Jsang, 1999] proposes a formal algebra for assessing trust in certification 
chain. The trust is represented by a symbol 
A ( iA i A A \ 
where 
co is trust of A's belief about p, 
A is an agent, 
p is a statement, 
b, p, u represent the belief, disblief and uncertainty 
components, and b + d + u = 1. 
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Two opinions are also defined in the paper, which are the key authenticity of the key 
used to certify and recommendation trustworthiness of how much one entity trusts another 
entity into recommending and certifying other keys. Those two opinions will be generated at 
the start of the network and remain stable for the rest of the time. We want to introduce 
another opinion about the system level trust, which is derived from the composition of the 
relevant program level trust values. 
The system level trust is a composition of program level trusts of the processes 
running on A2 which have relationships to the correct functionality of the network or 
authentication. The system level trust is a dynamic state representing the healthy state of the 
system. If part of the system is attacked and the program level trust of some critical process is 
lowered, the system level trust will be lowered correspondingly. The system level trust will 
be queried frequently between the entities. One possible update function could be as follows. 
r 7 jA A 
a>ST(A2)~lDST(A2)'CtST(A2)'UST(A2)f 
where 
^st(a2) = (0-9 x told + tnew)/(tnew == 0? 1: 2) 
d s T ( A 2 )  = 0 
4(4 ) = 1 - (0-9*" x U, + W /(^ = 0 ? 1: 2) 
The time parameter in this function remembers the time interval between the old trust 
value and the new trust value (the period between trust updates). Every system in the network 
queries each constituent program (party) on its current value. Its own trust value is updated as 
a function of the updated values through these queries. These actions are undertaken at a 
regular period. If a query yields an answer that the trust value is not available, the belief will 
be lowered and the uncertainty will be increased. 
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3.5 Related work on program level anomaly detection 
As we are the first to study the program level trust, we can not list any related work 
on program level trust in this section. Instead, we talk about two program level anomaly 
detection works. 
3.5.1 Fast Automaton-Based Method 
Fast Automated-Based Method [Sekar et al., 2001] is anomaly detection work based 
on system calls. Finite state automata are trained during runtime to model the sequence of 
system calls. After the training is finished, the system call sequence and location will be 
monitored against the finite state machine. The solution has both false positive and false 
negative on overflow attacks. 
3.5.2 Intrusion Detection via Static Analysis 
Intrusion Detection via Static Analysis [Wagner et al., 2001] is another anomaly 
detection work based on system calls. Four models are presented: trivial model, callgraph 
model, abstract stack model and digraph model. The trivial model monitors the runtime 
process against a set of possible system calls. The callgraph model generates a non-
deterministic finite automaton from the call graph. The abstract stack model derives a non-
deterministic pushdown automaton form the call graph. The digraph model computes a list of 
the possible ^-sequences of consecutive system calls for all the possible executions. The 
automata derived from source codes describe the process behavior better than the trained 
automata of Fast Automated-Based Method. 
Both Fast Automated-Based Method and Intrusion Detection via Static Analysis use 
the model based on system calls to describe process runtime behavior. The disadvantages of 
these approaches are: 
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1. The system calls model protection could be bypassed by mimicry attacks [Wagner 
et al., 2001]. The attacker could choose the state to attack the program or mimic 
the system calls to force the automaton into certain state, such that certain system 
calls are permitted. 
2. The system calls model is not fine-grained enough for program level trust. 
Wagner [Wagner et al., 2001] argued that "A compromised application cannot 
cause much harm unless it interacts with the underlying operating system, and 
those interactions may be readily monitored." This statement does not apply for 
program level trust because the program output is not longer trusted when the 
program control flow is changed by attacker at runtime, regardless of system call. 
3.6 Future work 
3.6.1 Separate monitor 
Another implementation of trust automaton separates the monitor from the monitored 
program. We need to guarantee several characteristics to generate a trustworthy value in a 
separated monitor framework. 
1. The runtime monitor cannot be compromised. 
2. The messages between the monitor and the program cannot be falsified. 
3. The compromised program cannot lie about its own state. 
To achieve these goals, we propose to add more architecture level and operating 
system level support based on trusted computing platform published by Trusted Computing 
Platform Alliance. The trust monitor will be moved into the trusted platform module (TPM) 
past of the computing engine. Some key aspects of the program state crucial input to the trust 
engine will be maintained by the TPM like engine in order to ensure the integrity of the 
monitored state variables. 
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3.6.2 Transaction level trust 
A transaction which involves several programs will receive several program level 
trust values. How to combine those values into a single value is an open question. We might 
need more powerful tools to describe the interactions between processes and calculate the 
trust level based on the component program level trust values. 
3.6.3 Trust function 
Trust function associated with trust automata will determine the dynamics of the trust 
value according to the program actions. It is a critical part of the trust policy. How to choose 
a suitable trust function for a given trust policy is an open question. 
3.7 Conclusions 
We proposed a control flow integrity based trust model. We argued why it makes 
sense to maintain a program's self assessment of trust. A compiler driven approach was 
presented and its performance overhead was reported. We also proposed an architecture level 
approach that is likely to be more efficient. 
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CHAPTER 4. STREAM AUTOMATA 
Both function pointer protection and control flow checking are compiler patches 
which require access to source codes. To cover the overflow attack and enforce security 
policies regardless of source codes, we implement a runtime monitor enforcing stream 
automata. Run time monitoring observes the action stream from a program either allowing a 
token to pass through to the operating system if the action is deemed to be safe or terminating 
the program on an unsafe action. Schneider [Schneider, 2000] evaluates the types of policies 
enforceable by security automata. Edit automata [Ligatti et al., 2005a] enhance the security 
automata by incorporating edit actions on the program action stream. We develop the notion 
of stream automata that sit between two communicating processes (we refer to one of the 
processes as the program and to the other as the system). The stream automata can perform 
simple edit actions on the program stream before forwarding it to the system and vice versa. 
These edit actions include action suppression, insertion, metamorphosis, forcing and two way 
forcing. We demonstrate that stream automata are strictly more powerful than either of 
security automata or edit automata. We show many policies enforceable by stream automata 
which cannot be enforced with edit automata. Moreover, stream automata allow us to model 
an open/reactive system, the complete interaction between a program and its environment, 
which was not possible with the earlier models. We implemented a security policy against 
buffer overflow attacks and a simple honeywall to demonstrate the power of stream automata. 
4.1 Introduction 
Formal verification of a program to determine its security vulnerabilities with respect 
to a security policy is an active research area. An alternative to static verification is run-time 
monitoring. For some policies, run-time monitoring is much more efficient since the 
instantiated run-time program state is available. In module checking [Kupferman et al, 1996] 
[Kupferman et al., 2001], all possible values for an environment variable have to be 
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considered, which often leads to exponential explosion in search space. For instance consider 
a pointer in a C program. In a run-time monitoring paradigm, we know exactly the value of 
the pointer when a certain property pertaining to this pointer needs to be verified. However, 
in module checking, all 232 possibilities (for 32-bit addresses) might have to be considered. 
This raises the question of what kind of policies are best monitored at run-time. The 
answer to a large extent depends on the monitored system. Consider the interactions of a 
program and the operating system (OS). The monitor screens all the OS service requests 
originating at the program before forwarding them to the OS. If these service requests violate 
a predefined policy, the monitor can either suppress such a request or terminate the program 
altogether. The computation time of the monitor is a relevant parameter since the 
program/OS transactions will experience this latency. Even a bigger concern might be the 
resource needs of such a monitor. If the monitor requires more resources than the monitored 
program, it may cease to be of practical value. Schneider [Schneider, 2000] considers such a 
monitoring paradigm with respect to monitors based on security automata (with resource 
usage similar to that of finite state machines). Security automata terminate the program on 
property violation (program execution truncation). A property compliant program action is 
passed to the OS unaltered. Ligatti et al. [Ligatti et al., 2005a] and Besson et al. [Besson et 
al., 2001] extended the domain of monitor actions from program termination and pass-on to 
some editing actions on the program actions. For instance, if a program action is deemed 
harmful to the OS, it could be suppressed or thrown away. The OS never gets to see it. These 
monitors were named edit automata. Edit automata are shown to be strictly more powerful 
than security automata in as much as they can enforce policies not enforceable by security 
automata. 
Note, however, that both these classes of monitors observe only the actions of one 
party (program) destined for another party (OS). How will the policies that entail examining 
the actions of both the OS and the program be enforced? One could argue that in such cases, 
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one edit automaton will monitor program actions destined to the system; and another edit 
automaton Eps will monitor the system actions with program as the target. What if the policy 
determines acceptability of an action based on what actions occur in program-to-system 
stream and system-to-program stream simultaneously? This is the gist of the current chapter. 
We define and develop stream automata to enforce security policies on P-S (program to 
system) and S-P (system to program) action streams. We also formally show that there exist 
real policies enforceable with stream automata which cannot be handled with edit automata. 
Note that the stream automata can be viewed as monitors (intermediaries) between an 
open/reactive program and the system. This makes them suitable for monitoring security 
policies of embedded systems. In fact, they can monitor the transactions between any 
arbitrary pair of processes (which need not to be limited to system and program viewpoint). 
For instance, a session between two ftp demons could be monitored with stream automata. A 
further generalization will allow the stream automata to consider more than two parties, each 
generating a stream of actions for the other parties. 
In the following sections, we will call the two parties in the environment of the 
monitor as system (which can denote as operating system, internet etc.) and a program 
(which can denote as process, applet etc.). The stream automata have full control over 
program but only partial control over system. 
The main contributions of the chapter are as follows: 
1. A new model of run time monitoring of open systems is proposed using stream 
automata. Syntactically, stream automata are similar to input-output automata 
[Maraninchi et al., 1996]. The proposed automaton sits between a system and a 
program and acts as a stream transformer to enforce security policies. 
2. Monitoring capabilities of stream automata are formally defined using SOS style 
operational rules [Plotkin, 1981] that clearly identify a specific monitoring action 
such as suppression or editing. This approach leads to a clear and formal way of 
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specifying monitoring actions by using rules for process composition as used in 
concurrency literature [Hoare et al., 1985] [Milner, 1989]. Our approach, thus, 
simplifies the underlying automata (unlike Edit automata where the automata 
definition is more complex and monitoring actions are informally specified). 
3. Stream automata are capable of all monitoring actions of edit automata. They can, 
in addition, perform new monitoring actions called metamorphosis, forcing and 
two-way forcing which are introduced in this chapter. These new monitoring 
actions are intended for the monitoring of open systems and are able to enforce 
additional policies called resource blind access control, ordering consistency, and 
barrier dependency. 
4. We develop a formal Turing machine model of stream automata monitoring 
framework. In this model, stream automata monitoring is incomparable to security 
and edit automata. We however informally establish that stream automata are 
more powerful than security or edit automata, and are capable of monitoring 
complex open systems such as embedded systems without any noticeable 
monitoring overhead. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We present related work in Section 
4.2. The notion of stream automata is introduced in Section 4.3. This section also presents the 
formalization of the monitoring capabilities of stream automata using structural operational 
semantics (SOS) [Plotkin, 1981] style rules. Section 4.4 presents examples of some 
enforceable security policies. This section also presents the power of stream automata using a 
new class of policies introduced in this chapter. Some of the experimental results are 
presented in Section 4.5. We conclude the chapter in Section 4.6. 
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4.2 Related work of formal model on monitoring 
Schneider [Schneider, 2000] introduced a formal model for execution monitoring. 
This was redefined by Viswanathan [Viswanathan, 2000] to account for computational 
capabilities of the monitor. Ligatti et al. [Ligatti et al., 2005a] enhanced the model further 
through edit automata that generalize the enforcement mechanisms beyond program 
termination. Fong [Fong, 2004] characterizes monitoring capabilities when the information 
about the program execution available to the monitor is parameterized (through shallow 
execution depths). Hamlen et al. [Hamlen et al., 2003] generalize the monitor actions to 
program rewriting. Ligatti et al. [Ligatti et al., 2005b] generalize edit automata to infinite 
execution traces to establish the feasibility of non-safety property monitoring. 
Stream automata may be viewed as input-output automata [Lynch et al., 1989] 
[Maraninchi et al, 1996] that transform streams. Figure 4.1 illustrates it through a schema. 











edited s-p stream 
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Figure 4.1 Stream Automata Runtime Monitor 
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One entity, program, generates a stream (LF)* of actions on its action alphabet Yf • 
Another entity - system - generates another stream (Ls)* on its action alphabet - . A 
stream automaton performs transformation of program streams (similar to edit actions of edit 
automata), system streams (edit actions applied to the system side) and can perform edit 
actions on both sides (program and system) at the same time. Inputs received either from the 
program or the system are used to trigger transitions in the automaton and outputs are used 
for editing actions. Type of editing actions depends on the type of output generated. 
Association of outputs on transitions is standard in reactive systems [Harel et al., 1996] 
[Harel et al., 1996] [Maraninchi et al., 1996] [Maraninchi et al., 2001]. This approach leads 
to simplification of the monitor transition system compared to edit automata that require 
multiple types of transition functions on the same automata (one for state transition and 
another for the specification of edit actions). 
The state space of a stream automata is partitioned into external (or system) states and 
internal states similar to standard open system models proposed by Kupferman et al. 
[Kupferman et al., 1996] [Kupferman et al., 2001]. The monitor receives external inputs 
either from the program or the system in an external state. In an internal state, the monitor 
engages in some internal computation (such as operation on internal variables or 
synchronization with other monitors). 
A transition in stream automaton is based on current state and input (an external input 
when in an external state or internal input from an internal state). The transition specifies a 
next state, and also an output action (which is a set). 
A definition of stream automata follows. 
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Definition 4.1. A stream automaton is a 5-tuple M = (Qm,q°m,^m,where 
1. Qm is a set of states that is partitioned into Qm, Q'm that are either external or internal 
states. External stats interact with external processes (both program and system) and 
internal states perform internal computation or synchronization with other concurrent 
stream automata, respectively. Let Qm =Qem \jQ'm. 
2. q°m is the initial state. 
3. is the input alphabet that is partitioned into that are program, system, 
and internal input alphabet respectively. Let lfm=T.pm U be the set of external 
inputs. Then Im=SemU S'm-
4. Ym is the output alphabet that is partitioned into Ypm,Ysm,Ylm that are programs, system 
and internal output alphabet respectively. Let Yem = 1% U Ysm. Then Ym = Ycm U Y'm. 
5. -^•:Qmx'Zmx 2r" x Qm is a transition relation satisfying the following constraints: 
(a) If 0 and ^  e then cr e 
(b) If (QUO",/,?,» ") and e 6^, then cr e Z^, 
In a stream automaton M, a transition is of the form (qm,cr,Y,qm') where qm is the 
source state, a is an input action, y is a set of output actions, and qj is a destination state. 
The transition triggers when the action a occurs (either in the environment or internally) and 
the triggering of the transition produces a set of outputs and results in the automaton 
changing state. We use superscript e or i to indicate if the monitor state is an external or 
internal state (qem, for example, denotes an external state of the monitor). Given a pair of 
states qm,qj we will use standard in fix notation qm —ajy > qm ' rather than 
(qm,cr,y,qm') e-*m . A^Y'm is a special output of the monitor that indicates that the monitor 
will suppress some actions occurring in its system. 
The additional conditions on the transition relation (conditions (a), (b) in Definition 1) 
constrain the input part of the transition based on the source state of the transition. When the 
source state of a transition is an external state, the input a has to be an external input 
( cr £ Y?m ), when the source state is an internal state then the input has to be an internal input. 




Figure 4.2 Example of Stream Automaton 
In this example, there are three states. State 0, which is an external state, is also the 
start state of the automata. State 1, is an internal state and State 2 is another external state. 
Input a is a program input, i an internal input and d a system input. From State 0, when an 
input a occurs in the program, the stream automaton, produces two different outputs b, c, 
where b is a system output and c is a program output. Thus, in this example, the monitor 
upon receiving input a from the program, produces two different outputs, one for the 
program and the other for the system. 
4.3.1 Enforcement actions 
This section presents the enforcement actions of stream automata. We formalize the 
enforcement actions by defining composition of the monitor with the program or the system 
(depending on the current state of the monitor). For composition, we follow standard 
approach used in concurrency and process algebras for process composition that uses SOS 
style operational rules [Plotkin, 1981] for process composition. We assume that the monitor 
sits between two processes, the system and the program and can monitor the state of both 
these processes. Using this model, we are able to formalize the existing enforcement 
mechanisms such as truncation, suppression, and insertion. In addition, we define new kinds 
of enforcement actions called metamorphosis, forcing and two-way forcing. 
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In the following, we assume that the system is an automaton of the form 
S = (Qs>1s>I-„->s) and the program is P = (Qp,q°p,I.p,->p) • Note that Z, = 2'm and 
Hp=Y,pm. Also, the transition relation is defined in the standard way: —Qs x Zs. x Qs and 
Qp x Y,p x Qp . We will use CCS [Milner, 1989] unobservable action z to represent all 
internal input actions in the composition. When an input action is r in the composite system, 
it is unobservable in the system (and hence will be hidden for both parties in the environment 
of the monitor, i.e. the system and the program). Greek symbols will be used in the following 
rules for input and output actions. A set of actions <x will be indicated by â. Special internal 
action A will be used for hiding or suppression. While A indicates an output action, A is 
used for the set containing the action A . Set representation is needed as a stream automaton 
generates sets of actions in the output of a transition. 
In SOS style, rule for process composition is defined as follows: 
conclusion 
For the shake of enforcement rules, the premise part is used to specify the transitions 
of the monitor and that of either the system or the program. The conclusion part specifies the 
transition of the composite system if the premises are true and also the side condition holds 
(the side condition is optional). We use qm,qj (with appropriate superscript) to denote the 
states of the monitor, qs,qs' for the states of the system and qp,qp to denote the states of the 
program. 
1. Truncation: This rule specifies that if the actions of the program conform to the 
actions of the monitor then it is allowed to proceed (by allowing the composite 
system to proceed). Implicitly, this rule causes termination, whenever there is an 
action in the program that is outside the monitored actions. In that case, the 
composite system has a null transition (i.e., the program is terminated). Note that 
this rule is identical to the CSP rule for parallel composition of concurrent 
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processes [Hoare et al., 1985]. Note that truncation can be only performed over 
programs but not over systems. 
Suppression: This rule specifies that violating actions can be suppressed for 
either the program or the system (there are two rules, one for the program and the 
other for the system). Suppression is performed whenever the program (the 
system) has a specific action that the monitor wants to suppress. The monitor then 
generates a special output A to suppress the program action. In the composite 
system, there is a r (an internal or unobservable [Milner, 1989]) transition. 
a. Program action suppression 
^ (<r ee 2^') 
b. System action suppression 
6  2^)  
Insertion: This rule specifies that program or system actions can be edited such 
that in addition to the received action, additional actions may be inserted into the 
action sequence. The monitor performs editing by outputting the observed action 
a from the program (or the system) together with additional actions y. In the 
composite system, the input actions are internalized (become r ) and the output 
actions( {cr}, y ) are visible. Note that y is a set while a is an individual action 
(which has to be made into a set since outputs from the monitor are sets). 
c. Program action insertion 
a
e alâ{jf >g ' a ' 
1w^o ( "W e 2 r , )  i p s  \  l m  '  1  p  
d. System action insertion 
E  ± P ( st ^  \ p  R  ^  O r i  
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e __£/ctUt _x  „ i  „ _ 2 _ v z 7  ' 
to:,î,)-^to„\1, .)Mtr er-<^ £ 2K} 
4. Metamorphosis: This rule specifies that program or system actions can be 
suitably altered (they undergo metamorphosis) before reaching the other party. 
During metamorphosis, the monitor transforms a program action to a different 
action and then sends it to the system. A dual is possible, where the monitor 
performs a metamorphosis of a system action before it is sent to the program. 
e. Program action metamorphosis 
f. System action metamorphosis 
5. Forcing: This rule specifies that program or system actions can be altered by 
force. If the program requests an action a, the monitor performs a different 
action a (for example, an applet requests the opening for the password file to the 
OS and in response the monitor actually opens a fake file). Note that unlike 
metamorphosis, the altered action of the monitor is visible only to the program. A 
dual forcing rule can similarly be applied for system actions. In the composite 
system, the input is internalized ( r ) and the output is â . 
g. Program action forcing 
„  ,  .  ^  ( c reZ: ,aE2 ' - )  
h. System action forcing 
6. Two Way Forcing: This rule generalizes forcing to both sides. This is possible 
either after receiving a program action or a system action. The monitor upon 
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receiving action a from the program, generates two sets of outputs /? which is 
meant for the system and y which is meant for the program. In the dual rule, the 
monitor upon receiving action a from the system, generates outputs /? which is 
meant for the program and y which is meant for the system. 
i. Two way forcing upon receipt of program action 
m  
'  *  f ) e 2 r - , y  e 2 r ' )  
j. Two way forcing upon receipt of system action 
a i p y s j  
< a s Z l , / 3 e 2 , - , f s 2 ' - )  ' Q s  > c i s  _ vv ô _ -.n: - _ 
Note that during an insert, it is not possible to make the input part empty in the output 
part. This is how the edit automata defines insert. Hence, there is a need to define the new 
operation that we callas metamorphosis. The difference between these rules is visually 
depicted using the Figure 4.3. 
4.4 Enforceable policy examples and the power of stream 
automata 
In this section, we present many examples monitors using stream automata. 
Subsequently, we discuss the power of stream automata compared to existing techniques for 
run-time monitoring. In the following Figures, we use the following notation on the 
transitions: input-part / (system-outputs; program-outputs). If any of the output parts are not 
specified, it indicates empty output for that part. 
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(a) Program Action Suppression 
Program 
Monitor System Program 
(b) System Action Insertion 
Monitor System Program 
System 
(c) System Action Metamorphosis 
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(d) Propram Action Forcing 
Program 
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Figure 4.3 Enforcement Operation Examples of Stream Automata 
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Paired Action Policy 
Consider a policy that insists on ensuring that before a new service request is entered, 
all the preceding request for that service ought to be completed. Such a policy makes sense 
for interrupt handling (only one pending interrupt per group of devices), or for cache miss 
handling from Level 2 cache to main memory (at most one or some small number of pending 
memory misses), or at most one http connection per httpd demon, or at most one or less than 
five malloc requests (until corresponding allocated memory pointer, mp actions). 
Figure 4.4 illustrates such a policy, qp is a program state which allows a malloc 
request from the program to pass through (since the memory pointers for all the preceding 
malloc requests have already been delivered). Hence, if a malloc request comes from the 
program, it is passed through unchanged to the system (OS). Similarly, in system state qsm 
the monitor is waiting for the allocated memory pointer for a preceding malloc request from 
the operating system. On such an input, the memory pointer mp is passed to the program 
unchanged, and the next state is qpm. What should happen if a malloc comes along in state qsm ? 
If we assume persistent programs and systems that continue to assert their actions until 
services (like an interrupt), it stalls the program at that malloc, which it services only when 
the monitor transitions to qpm after a mp from the system. We could build a monitor with 
some finite buffering for efficiency considerations. Let us say we would remember up to 3 
pending malloc actions. Then on a malloc in state qsm, we can transition to an internal state 
q'm], queue the malloc parameters into an internal data structure, and output A for the 
operating system ( A, ). On a memory pointer from OS in this state, we can transition to qsm 
w i t h  o u t p u t  m a l l o c  ( w i t h  a p p r o p r i a t e  p a r a m e t e r s )  t o  O S  a n d  o u t p u t  m p  t o  t h e  p r o g r a m  ( m p ,  
malloc). Figure 4.5 shows this scenario. In this example, we have demonstrated both 
suppression and insertion actions. 
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Figure 4.4 Paired Action Monitor 
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Figure 4.5 Modified Paired Action Monitor 
Online Bidding/Game Move Policy 
Consider another policy wherein two (or more) bidders submit a bid. The bidding 
protocol requires that all the bids be broadcast to all the bidders. However, the protocol must 
ensure that each bidder has already placed a bid before they are allowed to see all the other 
bids. A similar situation exists in a multi-player online game where each game proceeds in 
rounds. Each player makes a move in each round simultaneously. In these situations, the 
monitor should collect the tokens from both the parties before it sends them out to either of 
them. Figure 4.6 illustrates this policy. In state qpnohid , a bid from program(Party 1) is expected. 
However, when that bid bidp does come in, it is not revealed to any party through empty 
output action (A, A ). The monitor transitions to state qsonebid . In qsonebid, when the other bid 
bids is received, the monitor broadcasts both the bids to each other through output action 




bidp /(A; A) 
Figure 4.6 Online Bidding Monitor 
Monitor with a Transformed Program Semantics 
This example brings out another interesting and more powerful model for monitoring. 
Figure 4.7 illustrates the paradigm. The monitor sits between a system (network in this 
example) and program (the entire operating system or a specific demon in a server in this 
case). The monitor has an embedded firewall in this example. A basic firewall would 
interpret the firewall rules and classify each packet as suspicious (s) and drop it or would 
classify it as normal and let it pass. A monitoring firewall is shown on the RHS of Figure 4.7. 
It is a parallel composition of several automata. On the left, many automata are deployed for 
many different firewall rules. A packet p arriving in state q0 is processed for all firewall 
rules (each rule corresponding to an automaton starting in state g, or q2 or q} ). If the packet 
is deemed suspicious, the output destined for the program contains an annotated packet, the 
original packet p along with a flag 5 to indicate suspicion, and an empty output for the 
system ((p,s;A)). The second automaton shown in the RHS of the monitor classifies several 
levels of suspicion. If k consecutive suspicious packets (tagged as s by other firewall 
automata) are found, suspicion level sk is indicated to the system. In Figure 4.7, we only 
show two suspicion levels and s2. 
The program (demons or the entire OS kernel) associates semantics with these 
annotations (suspicion flags) inserted by the monitor (firewall). In the example semantics, 
level s, (only one suspicious packet) results in loss of file access privileges. Level s2 also 
loses internet access privileges. 
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Network Program Firewall 
Figure 4.7 Monitor Based on Transformed Program Semantics 
4.4.1 Power of stream automata: TM based model 
In this section, we show that stream automata (SA) are incomparable to security 
automata [Schneider, 2000], RW-enforceable class through program rewriting [Hamlen et al., 
2003], edit automata [Ligatti et al., 2005a], or infinite executions edit automata [Ligatti et al., 
2005b], This is in a formal Turing machine based model. We show in Section 4.4.2 later 
however through informal reasoning that stream automata are inherently more powerful than 
both Schneider's security automata [Schneider, 2000] (which will be referred to as EM 
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denoting enforcement monitor) and Ligatti et al.'s edit automata [Ligatti et al., 2005a] (which 
will be referred to as EEM denoting edit enforcement monitor). 
Definition 4.2. A program-system pair can be modeled as a pair of Turing machines (TP,TS). 
The program Turing machine Tp is like PM of [Hamlen et al., 2003]. It has an input tape, 
a work tape, a trace tape recording infinite sequence of actions, and a finite control. 
Similarly, the system Turing machine Ts is also a PM with an input tape, a work tape, and 
a trace tape. A key difference between a cross-product of two machines (Tp xTs) and the 
composition (TP,TS) assumed by us is that finite control of Tp bases its decision solely on its 
internal state qp, its input tape and work tape symbols (ap e Z,,,cr" G *Lwp ), and the contents 
of the trace tape Ts given by es. Thus we have 
This means that on a transition, the heads of input tape, work tape, and trace tape for Tp 
move independently along with unique write symbols for the work tape and trace tape 
o f  T p .  H t ,  H w  a n d  H s  s p e c i f y  h e a d  m o v e m e n t s  o n  t h e  i n p u t  t a p e  a n d  w o r k  t a p e  o f  T p  
and Tp's head on the trace tape of Ts. Note that we also assume that the head on the trace 
tape of Tp can only keep moving right, and hence no head direction is specified. Also note 
that Tp 's head on Ts ' s trace tape can only read. The transition function of Ts is defined 
similarly. Figue 4.8 shows such a Turing machine pictorially. 
4.4.1.1 Model 
A monitoring paradigm strives to project the state of the monitored program P 
through some projection function into an infinite stream of symbols A x [Ligatti et al., 
2005b], The state projection function Fs(p) need not be static for the entire program 
execution. 
Figure 4.8 Coupled Turing Machines for Program and System 
Hamlen and Schneider [Hamlen et al., 2003] model this a Turing machine, called a 
program machine PM, such that it has a private state captured on an internal working tape, 
and a publicly observable trace tape where monitor observable sequence A™ is written. No 
assumption is made regarding how Ap is derived from P allowing for an arbitrary, 
p o t e n t i a l l y  n o n - u n i f o r m  [ R u z z o ,  1 9 8 1 ] ,  f a m i l y  o f  s t a t e  p r o j e c t i o n  f u n c t i o n s  F s  ( p ) k .  
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The stream automata, however, model two concurrent processes that are composed. 
This machinery looks more similar to software protection models of oblivious Turing 
machines or RAMs as in [Goldreich et al., 1996]. We define the model formally now. 
4.4.1.2 Some observations 
We make some observations about incomparability of PM and PSM (program, system 
TM pair) in the following. 
1. For concurrent processes, PSM exposes the internal partitioning of a composite 
PM that would otherwise model a (system, program) pair. Within a PM model, 
the enforcement mechanism will have to argue overall possible partitions of the 
PM state space in order to satisfy the property predicate P in Schneider's 
framework [Hamlen et al., 2003] [Schneider, 2000], a significantly harder task 
than determining applicability of P to the two streams given by Ap'~ and As''. 
2. When an environment in an embedded system is captured as one of the processes 
(system or program), the relative power of SA becomes even more interesting. An 
environment in an embedded system could very well be a natural, non-
computational process (such as a sensor capturing density of pollen in the air). 
Such environments give rise to true input streams for data getting us into the 
murky and contested discipline of coupled Turing machines [Copeland, 1997] 
[Viswanathan, 2000]. The fact remains, however, that SAs are better prepared to 
handle such embedded systems than either of security or edit automata. 
3. We are more similar to edit automata than to program rewriting paradigms of 
Schneider [Hamlen et al., 2003] since the monitoring action forces an action on 
the program solely through its input stream rewriting. The program itself is not 
rewritable. 
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4. We will develop a class hierarchy within this monitoring model in our future 
work. 
4.4.2 Power of stream automata: informal reasoning 
In this section, we reason about the relative power of S As with respect to security 
(EM) and edit (EEM) automata informally with respect to policy classes. Before formalizing 
the power of stream automata, a new classification of security policies will be proposed. This 
classification extends Schneider's [Schneider, 2000] classification. The new class of policies 
is arrived at by weakening the access control policy and also by including policies that deal 
with multiple processes (rather than just talking about the program) as follows: 
Schneider's classification: 
1. Access Control - No execution of a program may operate on certain resources or 
invoke certain critical system operations. 
2. Availability - If a resource is acquired by a program then it is eventually released. 
3. Bounded Availability - If a program accesses a resource then it must release it 
within a specified bound (say within some fixed n steps). 
4. Information flow - Let s,,52 denote some input output pair such that s 2  =  f ( s ] )  
for some function / that performs the transformation operation. This policy 
specifies that if there exists a trace in the execution of the program where 
s 2  =  f ( s ]  ), then there must exist another trace where s 2  *  /(s,) .  
New Policies: 
1. Resource Blind Access Control - This requires that when a program tries to access 
some critical resource, it does not have capability to determine the quality of 
allocated resource, or does not care to determine this quality. It suffices for the 
resource requester to know that a resource has been allocated. This includes the 
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scenario where a fake resource (such as a fake-password file) is allocated by the 
resource manager (such as OS). In some sense, all that is required is for the 
resource requester is to know that a resource has been allocated (in the context of 
theory of knowledge). 
2. Ordering Consistency - When multiple concurrent processes execute, it is 
important to specify acceptable models for shared resource accesses in order to 
maintain an unambiguous semantics. The multiprocessing environments with 
shared memory have memory consistency models for this purpose. For concurrent 
processes composed through their input/output streams, ordering of events/actions 
at their input/output streams gives rise to a consistency model. This policy tries to 
ensure some ordering between the actions of the two parties involved (the system 
and the program). It requires that the program (the system)) be allowed to perform 
an action only after the system (the program) satisfies some condition. 
3. Barrier Dependency - This requires that the program and the system are allowed 
some information about the other party only after both of them satisfy some 
condition (have arrived at their barrier). 
These policies may be thought of as either safety properties (no bad states exist in the 
program which is defined by Lamport [Lamport, 1977] as nothing bad ever happens) or 
liveness properties (which assert that the program eventually enters a good state or in 
Lamport's terms - something good eventually happens). While access control, ordering 
consistency, barrier dependency and resource blind access control are safety properties, 
availability is a liveness property. Some policies like bounded availability combine safety 
and liveness. It has been shown in [Ligatti et al., 2005a] that EEM is strictly more powerful 
than EM. While EM only guarantees safety properties, EEM is able to guarantee safety and 
some safety-liveness properties (such as bounded availability). SA is capable of all 
operations performed by EEM (it has capability of truncation, insertion and suppression by 
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composition rules defined in Section 3.1). Hence it can emulate all monitoring actions of 
EEM. We illustrate the additional power of SA through the following theorems. 
Theorem 4.1. SA can enforce blind resource access control. This is not feasible under EEM. 
Proof. Blind resource access control demands that if some restricted resource is accessed, 
then it suffices for the program to receive a resource (whether genuine or a fake resource, or 
of any quality on a bigger continuum). It is easy to see that this policy is implementable 
under SA using the forcing rule. The proof is constructive. Given this policy, a monitor may 
be constructed such that whenever it sees the program performing access to the restricted 
resource (say action a ), it will immediately output a fake (some) action for the program (say 
action /? ). Thus, program action a is transformed to another program action (5 that 
conforms to the requirements of the policy. 
This is not feasible under EEM as none of the rules (truncation, suppression or 
insertion) can transform one program action into another. 
Theorem 4.2. SA can enforce ordering consistency. This is not feasible under EEM. 
Proof. Ordering consistency requires some ordering relationship between the actions of 
program and system (or system and program). The proof of this theorem is also constructive. 
Given an ordering consistency such that the program perform action a only after the system 
action a , we can create a monitor with two constructive transitions, one triggered by a 
from a system state and the next triggered a by from a program state. This monitor will 
m a k e  s u r e  t h a t  t h e  p r o g r a m  a c t i o n  ( a )  w i l l  f o l l o w  o n l y  a f t e r  t h e  s y s t e m  a c t i o n  ( a  )  i s  
completed. This monitor is shown in Figure 4.9(a). 
To show that it is not feasible under EM or EEM to enforce this policy, we use the 
following counter example. Obviously, there is no single monitor of EM or EEM category to 
achieve this enforcement. Hence, let us use two different monitors, one for the system side 
(shown in Figure 4.9 (b)) and the other for the program side (shown in Figure 4.9 (c)). The 
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system side monitor will have a transition triggered by a and the program side monitor will 
have a transition triggered by a. When these two monitors are executed in parallel (free 
running synchronous parallel, denoted ||, like CCS [Milner, 1989]), the composite system 
will have a state that will have both transitions enabled (either the program or the system can 
take its transition, independent of the other). This is depicted in Figure 4.9 (d). This 
composite monitor could not enforce this policy. 
X©=© 
(a) SA monitor for ordering dependency 
GO" 
(b) EEM monitor for system 
x©0" 
(c) EEM monitor for program 
(d) EEM monitor for program || 
EEM monitor for system 




(a) SA monitor for ordering dependency 
(b) EEM monitor for system 
a  I  ( a ,  a )  
(c) EEM monitor for program 
(d) EEM monitor for program || 
EEM monitor for system 
Figure 4.10 Constructive Example 
Theorem 4.3. SA can enforce barrier dependency. This is not feasible under EEM. 
Proof. SA enforces barrier dependency using two-way forcing. The proof is constructive 
(given a barrier dependency, the corresponding SA is easy to construct and the enforcement 
is performed using two way forcing rule). 
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To prove that it is not feasible under EEM to enforce barrier dependency, we use the 
following counter example. Consider a barrier dependency that demands that only after the 
program has performed action cr and the system has performed action a will both be 
allowed to view the action of the other party (this is similar to the online bidding policy 
discussed in the previous section). A monitor in SA for this policy is shown in Figure 4.10 
(a). 
Now consider EEM monitoring. Obviously, there is no single EEM monitor that can 
perform this. Hence, let us consider two EEM monitors, one for the system and the other for 
the program. The two monitors and their parallel composition are shown in Figure 4.10 (b), 
(c), (d) respectively. Obviously, the composite monitor is not able to enforce the barrier 
dependency policy. 
4.5 Buffer overflow & honeynet examples 
In this section, we demonstrate stream automata for more substantial system 
examples for a buffer overflow scenario, firewall and honey wall. 
4.5.1 Program monitor example 
Take the program 01.c as one simple example. It tries to call verifyQ followed by a 
call to criticalQ. However, due to the deliberate/intended over flow coding at Line 17, 3 
bytes of the function pointer/will be overflowed at runtime. 
Among the many possible runtime results, Table 4.2 shows one expected normal 
execution. Table 4.3 shows that the malicious user input could change the program behavior 
to execute criticalQ without executing verifyQ first. 
Notice that the function addresses are as follows: 
verify = 0x08048458 
critical = 0x08048470 
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Line 17 of Ol.c will overflow ch as scanf("n%x",&ch) will get 4 bytes and ch is only 
1 byte. The result will then overflow into 3 consecutive bytes following ch, which are the 3 
lower bytes of the function pointer/ As the highest byte of/s address is already 0x08, the 
user could change the lower 3 bytes of/ to point to verifyQ or criticalQ or a random invalid 
address to cause a core dump. 
Table 4.1 Ol.c 
01 #include <stdio.h> 
02 int verifyQ {printf("— VERIFY—\n ");} 
03 int criticalQ { 
04 fTLE 
05 char A[1024]; 
06 frfMf/r— Œ/77C4Z —in); 
07 fp = /open(''password", "r "); 
0& fscan(Jp, "%s ", A); 
OP fprintf("%s\n", A); 
10 
11 } 
12 int mainQ{ 
13 
14 char ch; 
15 /= 
16 printf("Input : "); 
17 scanf("%ox", &ch); 
18 printf("ch : %x\n ", ch); 
19 JO; 
20 f= critical; 
21 f(); 
22 } 
Table 4.2 overflows/with 3 lower bytes of verify and Table 4.3 overflows/with 3 
lower bytes of critical. 
For this program, we want to enforce a simple security policy: the program will 
access the real password file password only if verifyQ function has been called for proper 
verification. If a buffer overflow or similar attack bypasses verifyQ then only a fake password 
file fakepass is presented. This security policy could be used for privacy issues. This simple 
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policy also sets up a simple honeypot fake file (the attacker is not denied a password file, but 
is given access to a "honeypot" fake password file). 
Table 4.2 Expected Execution 
JTs 
01 Ol.c fakepass password 
$ cat password 
This, is.password.file. 
$ cat fakepass 
This. is.fakepass.file. 
2 07 
Input : 04845800 
ch : 0 
— VERIFY — 
— CRITICAL — 
This, is.password.file. 
Table 4.3 Exploited Execution 
TÔÎ 
Input : 0484700 
ch : 0 
— CRITICAL — 
This, is.password.file. 
— CRITICAL — 
This, is.password.file. 
Schneider's security automaton could also prevent the access to the real password file 
if the program calls criticalQ without first calling verifyQ. Bauer's edit automaton might be 
able to insert verifyQ action if possible or suppress the criticalQ action. Stream automaton, on 
the other hand, can force-change the program behavior totally. As shown in Figure 4.11, our 
automaton can force-change the open("password") to open("fakepass"). 
We implemented the monitor for this security policy. Table 3.4 shows the runtime 
result of the program with the monitor for this security policy. 
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verifyQ 
openÇ'password") / openÇ'fakepass") 
Figure 4.11 Resource Access Control Monitor 
Table 4.4 Security Policy Enforced 
$ zmonitor 01 
Input : 04845800 
ch : 0 
Monitor Output : Verified 
— VERIFY — 
Monitor Output : Verified accessing critical area. 
— CRITICAL — 
This, is.password.file. 
$ zmonitor 01 
Input : 04847000 
ch : 0 
Monitor Output : Unverified accessing critical area. 
— CRITICAL — 
This. is.fakepass.file. 
Monitor Output : Unverified accessing critical area. 
— CRITICAL — 
This, is.fakepass.file. 
This example illustrates resource blind access control. It demonstrates a very general 
scenario where a malicious input changes the program behavior due to (unintended) 
programming errors and bad programming habits. In such a case, we could still enforce some 
very powerful and flexible security policies based on stream automata instead of simply 
terminating the program. The advantage is that we not only prevent the attacker from getting 
valuable information, but we also generate false information to delude the attacker. 
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4.5.2 Honey wall policy scenarios 
Stream automata have access to a very powerful mechanism in program semantics 
transformation (Figure 4.7) to change the interaction between program and system 
fundamentally. We use a real application as an example to demonstrate its power: firewall. 
Firewall is a popular security technique. Sitting between Internet and LAN, the 
normal firewall rejects unwanted traffic and allows desirable traffic. The real firewall 
policies differ from case to case. 
We assume that the Internet is the system and LAN is the program. In this case, the 
firewall has full control of the program and traffic originating at LAN, but only partial 
control over the traffic from Internet. This is an ideal match to stream automata. 
Normal firewall accomplishes the following functions: 
1. Block the undesirable incoming traffic except for the LAN network service. 
2. Screen the outgoing traffic, allowing most of it. 
To formalize these two properties, we could use one automata to monitor the stream 
from LAN to Internet, outgoing traffic, and another one for Internet to LAN, incoming traffic. 
Both security automata and edit automata can handle these cases since computation involves 
accepting or rejecting an action stream. However, some coupled policies over two streams 
are not implementable by two independent automata. 
Take botnet as an example. We want to set up a policy that prevents sensitive 
information leakage, ".win" is one command of certain botnet which retrieves victim's 
Windows serial number. We want to stop the traffic from the potential victim once the 
firewall detects an IRC packet which contains ".win" in the incoming stream. Note that as to 
which token (such as ".win") actually serves as a trigger for the property action is an 
orthogonal issue. We are only concerned with the feasibility of such an enforcement action. 
We want to show that two independent automata are not able to implement this policy. 
The trigger for the policy is part of the Internet to LAN stream. The action required of this 
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policy operates on the symbols LAN to Internet stream. Unless, a coupled automata to couple 
the two streams is feasible, which is not the case in security and edit automata, this policy is 
not implementable with two independent automata. 
We consider several honeywall policies to further demonstrate the power of stream 
automata. Honeywall is a more complex firewall in front of a honeynet which is designed to 
trap/observe/monitor botnet behavior. Unlike a simple firewall which drops the malicious 
packets, a honeywall has a much more complex task. A honeywall needs to follow several 
basic principles: 
1. Allow malicious traffic on incoming stream. 
2. Allow the bot (LAN) connections to the server (Internet). 
3. Disallow the bot (LAN) exploits of other machines. 
For simplicity, we consider a countermeasure policy to a script kid using PhatBot 
downloaded from Internet. The reason we choose PhatBot is that its source code is publicly 
available. We embed a stream automaton at the firewall to defend/detect/monitor the script 
kid's actions. Notice that PhatBot has the ability to dynamically update its exploit codes. We 
do not intend to generate a complete set of firewall rules targeting PhatBot. That would be a 
too complex task for this chapter. We will take a few exploits from PhatBot as example for 
writing honeywall policies. 
We consider bagle exploit in PhatBot for stream automata. The PhatBot zombies 
might send an exploit containing string A to the target. We also define a harmless string B, a 






We will explore several firewall rules for this bagle exploit in order to compare the 
power of the three types of monitor automata: security automata, edit automata and stream 
automata. We will show that security automata and edit automata suffice for a limited set of 
firewall rules, while stream automata are capable of implementing a complicated honeywall. 
Truncation 
The simplest policy drops the connection if network traffic violates the honeywall 
policy. All three kinds of automata can satisfy this kind of policy. We skip this example. 
Suppression 
The difference between suppression and truncation is that truncation will drop the 
whole connection but suppression only suppresses certain packets in the connection. Edit 
automata have this capability through suppression. Security automata's only enforcement 
mechanism is to terminate the offending program. 
The stream automata to suppress the bagle exploit from PhatBot looks like: 
A 
Internet LAN 
Figure 4.12 Suppression 
Insertion 
Let us assume that the honeywall allows some of the malicious traffic to pass from 
Internet to LAN. It can, however, generate an alert token for the LAN, which can be 
interpreted with a different, benign semantics by the receiving LAN process. Security 
automata cannot generate an extra output, and thus are not capable of implementing this 
policy. Stream automata and edit automata can both satisfy this policy. 
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The stream automata to insert alert for the bagle exploit from PhatBot looks like: 
^  > 9 C '  
A A 
b 
Internet h LAN 
ffflfl B 
Figure 4.13 Insertion 
Metamorphosis 
Now let us assume that there is one PhatBot bot in the honey net which is located in 
the LAN. The firewall has to permit the traffic between the bot and the server. It must 
however immunize or sanitize the exploit traffic from the bot. Immunization/sanitization here 
means that the traffic is modified to be harmless (no information leak or similar weakness). 
This policy cannot be implemented by edit automata only. The combination of suppression 
action and edit action of edit automata might be able to express similar properties, but the 
structural framework to couple the incoming and output streams is missing. 
The stream automata look like: 
Internet LAN 
Figure 4.14 Metamorphosis 
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Forcing 
To further develop the preceding example, let us assume that the type of return packet 
expected by the bot can be predicted on the basis of outgoing token from the bot. The bot can 
be made to believe that it is operating in its desired context by the stream automata forcing 
the expected type of packet back to the LAN on receiving a malicious token in the outgoing 
stream. This behavior is benign with respect to the LAN honey net. Edit automata does not 
have the mechanism of reacting back to the program through a forced action. This limits its 
ability to implement such a policy. 
The stream automata look like: qsm —Al° >qsm 1 
A 
Internet , , LAN 
• • ^ 
* 
D 
Figure 4.15 Forcing 
Two way forcing 
This is a combination of insertion and metamorphosis. We assume that the firewall 
will send an alert packet to the LAN monitor, and it will also alter the outgoing packet. 
The stream automata look like: qsm —A'B,C > qsm 1 
C A 
' ' d 
Internet • . LAN 
• • ^ 
* 
B 
Figure 4.16 Two-way Forcing 
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4.5.3 Project SAFE 
Project SAFE (Stream Automata Firewall Engine) implements a firewall/honeywall 
engine using formal semantics of security automata. 
A transition is defined as Statex —> State2(EnvIn, EvnOut,Proln, ProOiit). 
Environment Input Program Input 
Internet 
Environment Output Program Output 
Figure 4.17 Traffic flow of SAFE 
4.5.2.1 Honeywall case 
In this session, we will demonstrate using a stream automaton to build a honey 
specially crafted for W32/Spybot.worm.gen.b. 
W32/Spybot.wrom.gen.b is a special breed of W32/Spybot.worm.gen. 
W32/Spybot.worm.gen is a botnet worm which mainly spread through 2 ways [McAfee, 
2003]: 
1. Scanning subnets for systems already infected by sub7 or kuang2. 
2. Camouflage itself with names like "porn.exe", "Matrix Screensaver 1.5.scr" etc. 











































retu rn ( RIG HTPAR EN); 
return(ARROW); 




Figure 4.18 Lexical 
After infecting the target system, the bot tries to connect to an external ire server on 
port 7000. Assume that the design goals of the honeywall are: 
1. Allow the outgoing traffic of ire such that we could observe the botnet activities. 
2. Disallow the sensitive information leaking out of the honeywall. 
3. Disallow the attacks get out of the honeywall. 
4. Falsify the output of bot such that the botnet master will not notice that the bot is 
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j STATE Definition 
j INI STATE Definition 
j ENV INPUT Definition 
j ENV OUTPUT Definition 
j PRO INPUT Definition 
| PRO OUTPUT Definition 
| TRANSITION RETURN 
j Name ARROW Name LEFT PAREN Name COMMA Name COMMA Name 
COMMA Name RIGHT_PAREN RETURN 
Definition: 





| List COMMA ID 
%% ' 
Figure 4.19 Semantic 
The normal ire traffic of the worm is listed in Figure 4.21. Take a look at the 
following botnet commands (a sample of similar commands could be found at [Mich, 2003]): 
1. ".win": Retrieve the windows key from the bot. 
2. ".scan 123.1.1.1 80 1 portscan.txt": Scan the network with ip address starting 
from 123.1.1.1 on port 80. The interval of the scan is 1 second and the result is 
stored in protscan.txt. 
3. ".ntstats": Get the information of the result of the scanning from the bot. The 
botnet expects a reply of ".ntstats :[NTScan]: Stats - Exploited 0 Systems." Where 
0 is the number of the systems that the bot successfully exploits. 
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NICK leechbot-idrk 
USER idrk "hotmail.com" "newshitz.dynu.com" :idrk 
JOIN #h4xOr h4x 
MODE uqzph +iR 
:irc.mOO.gov 332 leechbot-idrk admin 
:irc.m00.gov 332 leechbot-idrk :.info 
PRIVMSG :.info :.Version:. Leechbot r1.5b Private .cpu:. 2791MHz. Ram:. 255MB total, 160MB 
free 37% in use. OS:. Windows 2000 (5.0, build 2195). .Uptime:. Od Oh 45m. .Date:. 
20:0ct:2005 .Time:. 09:22:36 Current user:. Administrator .IP:. 192.168.2.2 .Hostname:. 
Win2000Pro .Windir:. C:\WINNT\ .Systemdir:. C:\WINNT\System32\ 
:irc.m00.gov 332 leechbot-idrk :.startlogger 
PRIVMSG :.startlogger :Send: :.startlogger 
:irc.m00.gov 332 leechbot-idrk :.listprocces 
PRIVMSG :.listprocces : [System Process] 
PRIVMSG :.listprocces :System 
PRIVMSG :.listprocces :smss.exe 
PRIVMSG :.listprocces :csrss.exe 
PRIVMSG :.listprocces :winlogon.exe 
PRIVMSG :.listprocces :services.exe 
PRIVMSG :.listprocces :lsass.exe 
PRIVMSG :.listprocces :svchost.exe 
PRIVMSG :.listprocces :SPOOLSV.EXE 
PRIVMSG :.listprocces :msdtc.exe 
PRIVMSG :.listprocces :svchost.exe 
PRIVMSG :.listprocces :llssrv.exe 
PRIVMSG :.listprocces :regsvc.exe 
PRIVMSG :.listprocces :mstask.exe 
PRIVMSG ..listprocces :VMwareService.e 
PRIVMSG :.listprocces :inetinfo.exe 
PRIVMSG :.listprocces :dfssvc.exe 
PRIVMSG :.listprocces :explorer.exe 
PRIVMSG :.listprocces :VMwareTray.exe 
PRIVMSG :.listprocces :VMwareUser.exe 
PRIVMSG :.listprocces :mdm.exe 
PRIVMSG :.listprocces :idag.exe 
PRIVMSG :.listprocces :rundll.exe 
PRIVMSG :.listprocces :..3.Operation Completed! 
() .10 [CTRL] (Changed window) 
:irc.m00.gov 332 leechbot-idrk :.scan 123.1.1.1 80 1 portscan.txt 
:irc.m00.gov 332 leechbot-idrk about 
PRIVMSG :.about :.Bot Versie:. Leechbot r1.5b Private,Leechbot r1.5b 
:irc.m00.gov 332 leechbot-idrk :.win 
PRIVMSG :.win Windows key: 888-888-8888 
:irc.m00.gov 332 leechbot-idrk ntstats 
PRIVMSG :.ntstats :[NTScan]: Stats - Exploited 0 Systems. 





scan/blah Exploited 0 Systems / 
Exploited 9 Systems 
Figure 4.21 Stream Automaton for Worm Honeywall 
DEFINITION 
INITIAL_STATE : {"s_a"} 
STATE : {"s_a", "s_b"} 
ENVIRONMENTJNPUT : { "scan", "null"} 
ENVIRONMENT_OUTPUT : {"Exploited 9 Systems", "000-000-0000", "null"} 
PROGRAMJNPUT : {"blah", "null"} 
PROGRAM_OUTPUT : {"Exploited 0 Systems", "999-999-9999", "null"} 
TRANSITION 
"s_a" -> "s_a" ( "null", "000-000-0000", "null", "999-999-9999") 
"s_a" -> "s_b" ( "scan", "null", "blah", "null") 
"s_b" -> "s_b" ( "null", "000-000-0000", "null", "999-999-9999") 
"s_b" -> "s_b" ( "null", "Exploited 9 Systems", "null", "Exploited 0 Systems"); 
"s_b" -> "s_b" ( "scan", "null", "blah", "null") 
Figure 4.22 SAFE Definition 
We want to implement the following stream automaton in figure 4.22 to enforce the 
honeywall design goals. Simply put, the stream automaton enforces that: 
1. Change outgoing sensitive information (Windows key, represented by 999-999-
9999, into a fake key, represented by 111-111-1111). 
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2. After receiving a ".scan" command, the honeywall will fake exploit statistics 
reply to the query ".ntstats". 
Finally, by using the stream automaton definition for SAFE in Figure 4.23, we finally 
implement the stream automaton to enforce honeywall policies for W32/Spybot.worm.gen.b. 
4.6 Conclusions 
This chapter proposes stream automata as a powerful tool for formal modeling of 
runtime monitors of open systems such as embedded systems. Open systems are reactive and 
hence interaction with the system is a key component of such systems. Kupferman et al. 
[Kupferman et al., 1996] [Kupferman et al., 2001] have proposed an approach for the 
verification of open systems using automata models that have both internal and external 
states. Our approach to run-time monitoring is inspired by this model. We view the monitor 
to be a process sitting between two processes, the system (say the operating system) and a 
program. The job of the monitor is to constrain both parties so that certain security policies 
are enforced (unlike earlier enforcement monitors that only constrain the program). We have 
developed a formal automata model of such monitors (which we call stream automata). A 
stream automaton has both internal states (where it performs internal computation or 
synchronization with another automaton) and system states (where it mediates between the 
system and the program). We have formalized the monitoring capabilities using SOS style 
operational rules for composing the monitor with its system. Using these rules we 
demonstrate how stream automata may be used for the formal modeling of existing 
enforcement monitors (such as Schneider's enforcement monitors and Ligatti at al.'s edit 
automata). We also have new rules for additional enforcement actions called metamorphosis, 
forcing, and two way forcing. We develop a Turing machine based model of stream automata 
based execution monitoring. This model seems to indicate that the power of stream automata 
is incomparable to that of security and edit automata. We can informally establish though 
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that stream automata are strictly more powerful than existing enforcement monitors. Stream 
automata can perform all actions of edit automata. It can, in addition, enforce new policies 
called resource blind access control, ordering consistency and barrier dependency. Many 
practical security monitoring examples are given to illustrate the power of stream automata. 
We also have implementation results to show that the overhead of run-time of such automata 
is minimal. In the future, we will explore composition and verification of run-time monitors 
using stream automata. We will also develop computability class hierarchy given by stream 
automata with the proposed TM model. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
5.1 Conclusions 
This dissertation explores methods to prevent overflow attacks. Most of the current 
research, both in compiling phase and execution phase, focuses on the protection of return 
address in the stack. However, advanced overflow attack which targets function pointer, 
integer, or other data structures could easily bypass the current protection. 
Starting from this problem, we implement three different approaches: 
1. Protect the potential function pointer set by encryption/decryption; 
2. Enforce the program runtime behavior according to its design; 
3. Enforce security policy on the interaction between program and system; 
The potential function pointer protection work is one of the first research efforts to 
target the set of function pointers. We implemented a compiler patch to get the set of 
potential function pointers according to the source code analysis. At runtime the variable in 
the set will be protected in a way so that its value will be encrypted before going to the 
memory and decrypted before being used in the program. The key for the 
encryption/decryption is generated by a random function with seed of the current time and 
process id. A remote hacker will not succeed as the key is dynamic for each run. Both weak 
and strong encryptions are implemented for this approach. The weak encryption function is 
XOR and the strong one is RC5. The strong encryption/decryption guarantees that even if the 
hacker gets both clear text and encrypted text, the key is not derived easily. The system 
overhead is acceptable and is lower than 5% for XOR encryption scheme. 
The protection of function pointers does not provide complete coverage for overflow 
attack targets. For example, the attacker could change the value of a critical variable to 
bypass security checks and run privileged codes. To conquer this problem we came up with 
control flow checking automata from anomaly protection point of view. 
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Control flow checking automata are generated according to the control flow graph of 
high level source codes. The automata are enforced during runtime by codes inserted during 
compiling phase. As the control flow checking automata work at a basic block level, the 
attacks that change the program control flow within the program will be detected 
immediately. The integer overflow attacks and part of the function pointer overflow attacks 
fall into this category. Control flow checking automata also generate a program level trust 
value indicating how well the runtime program behavior matches the design. 
The preceding two implemented works are both at compiling phase and not suitable 
for legacy codes. To extend the formal monitoring work of control flow checking, we 
implemented stream automata monitor which monitors the program execution at the runtime. 
Stream automata monitor screens the interactions between system and program. The 
system represents the runtime environment for the program. We assume the monitor has full 
control of the program and partial control of the system. The stream automata monitor could 
enforce security policies on different virtual levels. We implement the program level monitor 
to enforce control flow checking policy and detect overflow attacks. We also present a 
network level monitor to enforce firewall/honeywall policies and build honeypot to trap 
Internet attackers. 
5.2 Future work 
The future work of the thesis includes: 
1. The architecture support for encryption/decryption. The strong 
encryption/decryption will bring obvious system overhead. Specially designed 
hardware chips will decrease system overhead dramatically. 
2. The architecture support for security monitor. As the runtime monitor has the 
privilege to monitor and control other programs, the monitor itself could easily be 
the target. Thus a separated runtime environment is necessary for the success of 
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monitoring. A similar framework in Microsoft's Next Generation Security 
Computing Base is one of the candidates which provide support for separated 
running. 
3. Formal verification of complex stream automata. NuSMV [Cavada, 2006] is a 
tool to verify the property of general automata. A similar tool working for stream 
automata could help to verify complex program monitoring policies and 
firewall/honeywall policies formally. 
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